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ARTICLE
PROPERTY IS A TWO-WAY STREET: PERSONAL
COPYRIGHT USE AND IMPLIED
AUTHORIZATION
Michael Grynberg*
When we use the Internet, we know that copyright law limits our
freedom. We know, for example, that downloading popular music is legally
risky. Those who want to get moralistic about it argue that illegal
downloading violates a “property” right of the copyright holder. But what
about our property rights in our computers? Even if copyright is a form of
property, it maintains a parallel existence as an intrusion upon property
rights. This intrusion is increasingly a part of daily life, as copyright’s
literal scope sweeps broadly enough to threaten a range of everyday
activities that social norms regard as acceptable.
These observations form the basis of a “moral” critique of copyright
law, but they do not figure prominently in modern doctrine. This Article
looks to the common law property rights of copyright users to develop a
framework for limiting copyright’s reach. If we take seriously traditional
rules governing the interplay between statutes and preexisting common law
rights, courts have room to incorporate user property rights into copyright
doctrine. First, the common law provides a baseline against which the
Copyright Act should be construed. Courts should be reluctant to interpret
the statute in a manner that negates longstanding expectations that
personal property may be used in conjunction with copyrighted material for
personal purposes.
Second, the property rights of copyright users offer a new foundation for
implied license doctrine. Instead of looking solely to the conduct of the
licensor (i.e., the copyright holder) to determine whether an implied license
to use copyrighted content exists, courts should appreciate the reasonable
expectations of consumers in their control of personal property used to
* Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. My thanks to
Kelly Baldrate, Andy Spiropoulos, Deborah Tussey, and Steven Willborn for their helpful
comments and to Oklahoma City University for the summer grant that supported my
research. Earlier drafts were presented at faculty colloquia at Oklahoma City University and
Seton Hall and at the Washington University Law School’s junior faculty regional works-inprogress workshop. The final product benefited from the resulting questions and
conversations.
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interact with the protected works. Expanding our conception of implied
license in this manner would help address the uneasy status of personal
uses of copyrighted works under modern law.
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INTRODUCTION
When we venture online, we know that copyright law limits our freedom.
We know, for example, that making and posting a mashup video that uses
popular songs tempts litigation. If we want to get moralistic about it, we
might say that the risk comes from using the “property” of copyright
holders. Fair enough,1 but what about our property rights in our computers?
Copyright law cannot exist without limiting them.
The same is true of “intellectual property” (IP) generally. Authors,
inventors, and other creators of ideal goods have entitlements with some of
the attributes of property,2 but these powers come at the expense of the
1. For the sake of argument, anyway. But see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006) (“The ownership of a copyright may be
transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may
be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession.”); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the
attributes of personal property.”). The label intellectual “property” is itself controversial
because it carries the rhetorical implication that patents, copyrights, and their like deserve
treatment as property in the same way as do land and personal property. For that reason,
opponents of strong intellectual property (IP) rights often favor different nomenclatures. See,
e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008);
Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523
(2008).
A number of articles discuss restrictions imposed by IP holders on the objects
embodying their protected right as being a form of servitude. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of
the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual
Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 506 n.479 (1999) (collecting sources). Although I note
analogous examples in developing my theory of implied authorization, see, for example,
infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text, my focus is elsewhere. This Article focuses on
the manner in which IP law regulates not property that embodies protected content, but
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property rights of others. Third parties cannot use their tools, be they
printing presses or computers, to tread upon IP rights.3 In effect, IP exists
as a negative easement.4
While the insight that intellectual property burdens third-party property
rights is not new, its ramifications are surprisingly scarce in modern
doctrine. This Article addresses the gap in copyright law. Copyright’s
modern expansion casts doubt on the legality of a wide range of everyday
copyright uses. Greater sensitivity to the property rights of copyright users
offers new avenues for protecting personal use rights. First, common law
property rights provide a baseline against which the Copyright Act may be
construed. Courts should be reluctant to interpret the statute in a manner
that negates longstanding consumer expectations of a right to use personal
property in conjunction with copyrighted material.
Second, the property rights of copyright users present a new foundation
for an expanded implied license doctrine. Instead of looking solely to the
conduct of the licensor to determine whether an implied license to use
copyrighted content exists, courts should appreciate the reasonable
expectations of copyright users in their control of personal property used to
interact with protected works. Enlarging our conception of implied
license—for convenience, I call this expanded understanding implied
authorization—would help address the uneasy status of personal uses under
modern copyright doctrine.
Part I explains the problem facing personal copyright uses. Modern
copyright law suffers from a split personality. Copyright’s literal scope
sweeps so broadly as to apparently prohibit a range of everyday activities.5
But we nonetheless engage in them as a matter of course. By our actions,
we may trust that we have a right to copy purchased music for personal use,
but when push comes to shove—when there may be legal ramifications—
the true state of the law is muddy.6

personal property used to interact with such content. My interest is in the record player, not
the record.
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (copyrights); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (patents).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the
Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543–48 (describing a hypothetical day in the life
filled with ordinary activities that collectively incur $12.45 million in potential liability
under the Copyright Act).
6. Compare, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (comparing space shifting to time shifting blessed in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)), with UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting
space shifting argument applied to My.MP3.com as “simply another way of saying that the
unauthorized copies are being retransmitted in another medium—an insufficient basis for
any legitimate claim of transformation”). And those of us who are sure are not necessarily
sure as to why. See Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 597
(2008) [hereinafter Litman, Goo]; Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1871, 1903 (2007) [hereinafter Litman, Lawful Personal Use] (noting that were many
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Two well-documented trends spurred the increased prominence of
copyright’s law/norm mismatch. First, copyrights are more robust than a
century ago. They are stronger, last longer, and cover more works.7
Second, the Internet’s popularization increased both the ease and notoriety
of potential infringements.8 Public collisions between legal interpretation
and socially acceptable practice are increasingly likely.
This law/norm divide is especially problematic with respect to personal
uses of copyrighted matter.9 Individuals are ill-equipped to navigate the
difficulties of either licensing or litigating access to copyrights. The effort
can flummox the most sophisticated, well-capitalized parties.10 To be sure,
most personal uses of copyrighted works go unchallenged by rights holders.
It is problematic, however, for everyday activities to depend on the
potentially fickle toleration of copyright owners. And if everyday life
becomes a more digitally mediated experience, the toleration model is an
unstable basis on which to rest future cultural development.11
Copyright law has not developed an effective response. The fair use
doctrine offers an obvious safety valve for some personal uses,12 but the
doctrine is unpredictable in application. Supreme Court precedent directs
lower courts to apply the doctrine in a case-specific manner, which stifles
the development of clear guidelines for acceptable and non-acceptable
unauthorized copyright uses.13 And even if fair use’s potential is undersold,
advocates of strong personal use rights may well wonder at the wisdom of
placing too many eggs in a single doctrinal basket.
Some suggest greater use of implied licenses as an alternative to fair use.
Implied copyright licenses traditionally ameliorated difficulties arising from
copyright law’s division of ownership between a copyright and the work
that embodies protected expression. A party who commissions a work but
fails to bargain for the copyright may still claim a license to use the work
even if the use implicates rights protected by the Copyright Act.14
Implied licenses may sweep more broadly in the online world, but efforts
to expand their use suffer from a core weakness. Even broad licenses may
be revoked. Traditional understandings do not support a doctrine robust
personal uses to be challenged, “[c]opyright lawyers may disagree on what theory the
copyright owner should lose, but not about the ultimate result”).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. This Article uses Jessica Litman’s definition of personal use. A personal use is “a
use that an individual makes for herself, her family, or her close friends.” Litman, Lawful
Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1894.
10. See generally Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145
F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998) (litigating whether a 1939 music license allowing use of
composition in film also authorized use in video version of the film).
11. See infra Part I.A.2.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
13. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not
to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for
case-by-case analysis.”).
14. See infra Part I.C.
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enough to overcome such revocations. If copyright implied license is to be
broadened, another legal basis is needed.15 Otherwise, reform efforts based
in implied license will be vulnerable to a plausible formalist objection:
section 106 of the Copyright Act vests in the copyright holder the exclusive
right to authorize acts regulated by the statute.16
Part II responds by arguing that with respect to copyright users, the
Copyright Act is not the only relevant law. Whatever the status of
copyright as “property” in the same sense as land or chattels, copyright is
simultaneously an interference with property rights.17 Each copyright
holder has an effective negative easement in the tools others might use to
interact with copyright-protected material. This characterization brings into
play the common law property rights of copyright users. They are
important for three reasons. First, they make clear that a copyright action is
more than an effort to prevent a “trespass” to property rights, but is
simultaneously a mediation of competing property interests. Second,
judges construe statutes against the baseline created by common law
principles and rights. Courts are traditionally reluctant to read legislation as
interfering with expectations based in the common law absent a clear
statutory command. Third, even when a statute alters the common law
baseline, traditional understandings remain a source of law to fill gaps in
the displacing statute.18
Part III explores the consequences of these observations. The common
law property rights of copyright users provide the basis both for a
narrowing construction of the Copyright Act and for a revised copyright
implied license doctrine. A complete doctrine would incorporate not only
the conduct of the copyright licensor, but also the property-based
expectations of the putative licensee. Although copyright law necessarily
displaces and limits a user’s common law property rights and expectations,
it does not extinguish them. They remain a part of the baseline against
which the Copyright Act writes. When construing Congress’s handiwork, it
is appropriate to interpret the statute against this baseline, particularly with
respect to establishing what uses are “authorized.” The reasonable
expectations of copyright users about their rights to their own property help
determine when a particular use would be perceived as permitted.
What then defines the reasonable expectations of copyright users?
Courts may look to governing social norms that they are prepared to ratify
as reasonable. Using a computer to space shift music from a CD to an iPod
might be acceptable in a way that surreptitious use of a video camera inside
a movie theater is not. In this manner, courts may account doctrinally for
the lack of congruence between copyright rights as perceived by their
holders and actual public practices. These practices can help shape judicial
interpretations of what a user may reasonably assume is within the scope of
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part I.C.2.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.E.
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her rights when using copyrighted works, as well as the level of conduct
required of copyright holders to “revoke” that authorization through the
assertion of rights under the Copyright Act.
This latter point is essential. To be viable, the approach advocated here
must respect Congress’s delegation to copyright owners of the exclusive
right to authorize the protected acts of section 106. But while the statute
gives copyright holders the exclusive right to authorize certain acts, it does
not define authorization or the manner in which authorization is to be
implemented. A statutory gap exists. And in fact, copyright owners engage
in a range of choices with respect to enforcing their copyrights. When
courts evaluate what these choices authorize or forbid, they should look to
the reasonable property-backed expectations of licensees as an
indispensable part of the analysis.
I. COPYRIGHT AND THE PROBLEM OF “TOLERATED” USES
This part sketches the problem of copyright’s expansion and the potential
ramifications for personal copyright liberties. The story is a familiar one,
and more extensive accounts are available elsewhere.19 The purpose here is
neither to win converts to the anti-expansionist cause nor defend it against
counterattacks. My concern is with the doctrinal challenge of limiting
copyright’s growth, assuming the premise that the enterprise is a worthy
one. After considering the structural difficulties of reform and the
limitations of the fair use doctrine, this part concludes by considering
proposals to bolster the use of implied licenses as a check to broad
assertions of copyright.
A. The Challenges of Modern Copyright
Copyright’s potential scope exists uneasily alongside many everyday,
unauthorized, and arguably infringing uses of copyrighted material. This
collision of law and norms—more precisely, its current prominence—is the
culmination of two trends: copyright’s expansion and the Internet’s
popularization. Infringement is both simple and public in a digital,
networked environment. Cracking down on infringement may harm
personal use rights because copyright doctrine has done a poor job of
developing safeguards to protect them.
1. Copyright’s Growth
Both Congress and the judiciary may claim credit for the growth in
copyright’s scope.

19. See, e.g., Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 591–96.
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a. Congress
Congress consistently strengthened the power of copyright over the last
four decades.20 Its handiwork makes copyrights easier to obtain,21 more
powerful,22 longer lasting,23 and buttressed by laws that control access to
copyrighted works when technology alone cannot do the trick.24 To be
sure, the Copyright Act also checks copyright’s reach.25 And it has been
argued that the 1976 Act’s rewrite of copyright law was intended largely as
a conservative enterprise that would preserve the traditional balance of
interests between copyright users and owners.26 Unfortunately, there is a
20. Two key milestones are the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, and the addition in 1972 of a distinct copyright in
sound recordings, rather than simply in the musical composition. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
21. The 1976 Act reduced the importance of copyright formalities by liberalizing the
requirement that a copyright holder affix a notice of copyright on her work. Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 405, 90 Stat. 2541. Congress later dispensed with the
requirement altogether, Act of Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, and
opened the door for foreign authors to reclaim U.S. copyright to works that were unprotected
due to a failure to adhere to domestic formalities. 17 U.S.C. § 104A.
The 1976 Act further liberalized copyright law by providing that copyright subsists
“in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a). Under the predecessor 1909 Act, copyright extended only to works published with
proper notice. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1909), renumbered § 10, repealed 1978). The 1976 statute also eliminated
the distinction between published works, which received federal protection, and unpublished
works, which until then had not.
22. The 1976 Act added a new right of public display and defined public performance
broadly enough to supersede a narrow construction given the right by the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 592 n.35; infra Part III.D.1.b.
23. Under the 1909 Act, the copyright term lasted twenty-eight years and could be
renewed for an additional twenty-eight years. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (repealed 1978). The
1976 Act extended the term to the life of the author plus fifty years or, in the case of works
for hire, the shorter of seventy-five years from publication or 100 years from creation. 90
Stat. 2541. In 1998, Congress further extended the term to the life of the author plus seventy
years or the shorter of ninety-five years from publication or 120 years from creation in the
case of works made for hire. Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)).
24. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) proscribed the unauthorized
circumvention of technological measures designed to control access to copyrighted works
and restricted the development and distribution of tools designed to circumvent
technological measures that control access or protect copyright rights held by the copyright
owner. 17 U.S.C. § 1201. Critics contend the statute interferes with the ability of users to
engage in fair and otherwise legal uses of copyrighted content. See, e.g., Unintended
Consequences: Ten Years Under the DMCA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 6 (Oct. 28, 2008),
http://www.eff.org/files/DMCAUnintended10.pdf.
25. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110 (precluding copyright rights over performance and display
from applying to certain activities). Professor Litman notes that in revising the copyright
statute, Congress generally sought to preserve the status quo with respect to established
copyright uses with specific carveouts of the sort found in § 110. See Litman, Goo, supra
note 6, at 591–96.
26. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 593 (“Congress’s rewording of the reproduction,
adaptation and distribution rights were understood as simplification and codification of the
scope of those rights under the law as construed by the courts, and not as enhancements of
their reach or strength.”).
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mismatch in the textual specificity of these two sides of the copyright coin.
The statute uses broad language to define copyright rights. Section 106 of
the Act gives copyright holders exclusive rights to “reproduce,”
“distribute,” “perform,” “display,” and “prepare derivative works based
upon” copyrighted works.27 These broad grants leave courts with discretion
to enforce powerful copyrights.28
In contrast, copyright’s limitations—with the notable exception of fair
use, discussed below29—are tightly cast.30 Compare, for example, the
broad definition of the performance right with its exceptions.31 Many of the
latter are written as narrow carveouts not designed for the public at large.32
Similar examples dot the statute.33
Moreover, the overlapping nature of the rights granted by section 106
undermines the Copyright Act’s limitations. Litigation over Cablevision’s
efforts to provide customers with off-site DVRs is an example.34 Copyright
holders maintained that keeping DVR storage capacity at Cablevision’s
facilities rendered the company directly liable for infringement.35

27. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
28. Some of these terms are defined elsewhere in the statute, but broadly. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”) (emphasis added). Compare Mirage
Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343–44 (9th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that lawfully purchased prints that were glued onto tiles and resold constituted
derivative works), with Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1997) (disagreeing
with Mirage on similar facts).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see infra Part I.B.1.
30. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 593 (“By articulating exclusive rights in general,
broad language and delineating exceptions in narrow, detailed, specific language, the drafters
of the statute time-proofed the exclusive rights, while leaving the specific exceptions
vulnerable to obsolescence.”). Professor Litman traces the mismatch to the process behind
the statute’s drafting, describing it as a negotiation between industry interests. Jessica
Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 280–81
(1989).
31. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompanying it audible.”), with id. § 110.
32. See, e.g., id. § 110(5)(B) (setting size and device limits for establishments permitted
to communicate transmissions made by broadcast or radio); id. § 110(10) (exempting
performances of nondramatic literary or musical works “in the course of a social function
which is organized and promoted by a nonprofit veterans’ organization or a nonprofit
fraternal organization to which the general public is not invited” if the proceeds are used for
charitable purposes). To be sure, other provisions of section 110, applying to personal users,
are somewhat broader. See, e.g., id. § 110 (5)(A).
33. See id. §§ 108–22.
34. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009).
35. Id. at 124 (“[T]he RS-DVR allows Cablevision customers who do not have a standalone DVR to record cable programming on central hard drives housed and maintained by
Cablevision at a ‘remote’ location.”). They did so even though consumer experience of the
service resembled that provided by home-based DVRs like TiVO, which, in turn, arguably
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Cablevision convinced the Second Circuit that it was not making “copies”
under the statute when the DVR copies were made at consumer direction.36
That did not exhaust the claims against it, however, as the copyright
plaintiffs also claimed a violation of their reproduction rights (because of
transient cache copies made by Cablevision) and their performance right
(arising when Cablevision transmitted the consumer-saved copies back to
its customers). Though both claims failed as well,37 they highlight the
statute’s potential to take away with one provision what it gives with
another.38 In a similar vein, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) purports to preserve fair use rights, but makes illegal distributing
tools used to circumvent technological access controls even if the purpose is
to facilitate fair use.39 Ripping a DVD to create a backup copy may be fair
use, but the right means little if Congress prohibits commerce in the
necessary tools.40
These features of the Copyright Act have been criticized for being
unresponsive to technological change while creating barriers to entry for
new technologies.41 But the deeper problem is that Congress’s disparate
treatment of copyright holders and copyright users gives courts more
leeway to expand copyright rights than to constrain them.42 The copyright
statute inconsistently mixes delegating and non-delegating language.43 Its
broad provisions cannot be applied without judicial interpretation of their
resemble the VCR approved by the Supreme Court in Sony, but the fair use issue was off the
table as was a theory of contributory infringement. Id.
36. Id. at 133 (“[C]opies produced by the RS-DVR system are ‘made’ by the RS-DVR
customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this reproduction by providing the system does
not warrant the imposition of direct liability.”).
37. Id. at 130 (“[W]orks in this case are embodied in the buffer for only a ‘transitory’
period, thus failing the duration requirement.”); id. at 139 (“Because each RS-DVR playback
transmission is made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy produced by that
subscriber, we conclude that such transmissions are not performances ‘to the public,’ and
therefore do not infringe any exclusive right of public performance.”).
38. Cf. id. at 134 (“[W]e note that our conclusion . . . that the customer, not Cablevision,
‘does’ the copying does not dictate a parallel conclusion that the customer, and not
Cablevision, ‘performs’ the copyrighted work.”); see also David Nimmer, Brains and Other
Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26 (1996). Current litigation
over the sale of ringtones is another example of attempts to leverage the Copyright Act’s
multiplicity of rights. See generally In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (rejecting argument that distribution of ringtones to customers results in a public
performance requiring licensing fees). This multiplicity, moreover, creates significant
licensing issues when the various copyright rights are fragmented among multiple owners.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443
(2d Cir. 2001).
40. See generally Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting preliminary injunction against distribution of DVD copying
software).
41. See, e.g., Endangered Gizmos, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://w2.eff.org/endangered
(last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
42. I have argued elsewhere that a similar problem exists in trademark law under the
Lanham Act. See Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark
Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 903–24 (2009).
43. 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 2:8 (2009).
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proper scope, inviting effective “common law development,” and potential
expansion, by the courts.44 Countervailing provisions, again with the
exception of fair use,45 are written with language that is not similarly open
to adaptive judicial interpretation. These choices have ramifications for
judges independent of their view of the relative merits of strong
copyrights.46 Courts may or may not accept the invitation of copyright
plaintiffs to construe the Act expansively, but they have fewer doctrinal
levers with which to aid defendants.
b. Judicial Interpretations
A Copyright Act susceptible to broad interpretation is necessary but not
sufficient for broad copyright law. Judges must accept the invitation of the
statute’s open text to provide a liberal interpretation of copyright rights.47
Many have.
Courts have liberally interpreted the various exclusive rights given
copyright holders by section 106. Thus, the mere loading of a computer
program from a disk into temporary memory for purposes of operating the
machine is a reproduction.48 Gluing purchased prints onto tiles may be a
derivative work.49 The ability to distribute a copyrighted work may
substitute at trial for evidence of actual distribution.50 In contrast, judges
are sometimes miserly in interpreting copyright exclusions.51 Other courts
44. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
187, 198 (2004).
45. See infra Part I.B.1.
46. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Sometimes Congress specifies values or ends,
things for the executive and judicial branches to achieve, but often it specifies means,
creating loopholes but greater certainty.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 546–47 (1983) (arguing that courts must respect legislative choices with
respect to “creating or withholding gap-filling authority”).
47. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 596 (“Thirty years ago, an assertion that copyright law
gave the copyright owner the exclusive right to ‘use’ its copyrighted work would have been
dismissed as an obvious misunderstanding. Recently, it’s become almost respectable as a
description of the rights copyright owners do control, or should.” (citing ALAN LATMAN,
STUDY NO. 14: FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958), reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT
SOCIETY OF THE USA, STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781 (1963))).
48. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a copy is created for purposes of the Copyright Act when a program is loaded
from a disc into a computer’s RAM in order to operate the program).
49. See supra note 28.
50. Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir.
1997) (stating that “[w]hen a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its
index or catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing or browsing public,
it has completed all the steps necessary for distribution to the public” even if no evidence of
public use exists). The music industry has made similar arguments in pursuing defendants
who have uploaded music files into the “shared” folder of file sharing programs, but where
evidence is lacking of actual copies made as a result. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 595 n.59.
51. For example, the Third Circuit found a “public” performance where a video store
made available to customers private booths for viewing rented cassettes. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63–64 (3d Cir. 1986). Interpretation of the DMCA
is another example. The statute provides that it shall not be construed to limit fair use rights.
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see the scope of the commercial monopoly granted by the copyright statute
as a broad one, affecting their interpretation of fair use claims.52 Indeed,
the specificity of copyright’s exclusions may be used to broaden the scope
of rights granted in section 106.53
The pattern of rulings in favor of strong copyright rights is not uniform,54
and copyright should not be defined by its most extreme judicial
interpretations. But legal uncertainty has a similar effect on potential
Moreover, the
defendants as a more uniformly extreme view.55
rights/restriction mismatch created by the statute allows judicial
interpretation to function as a ratchet in favor of strong copyrights. Courts
do not always adopt the broadest possible view of copyrights, but statutory
language makes them better copyright expansionists than restrictionists.
For good or ill, Congress is the one that has placed a thumb on the scale,
and the courts have balanced predictably.
2. Increasing Collisions Between Norms and Law
Modern copyright law does not want for critics. Some ask fundamental
questions of whether copyright really “promote[s] the progress” of
authorship or is mere rent seeking.56 Others focus on burdens to expressive
or other interests of users of copyrighted content.57 Nestled in this latter
17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006). Some courts have nonetheless concluded that the statute’s
protection of “access-control” measures do not run afoul of that limitation, even if the
purpose of the circumvention is the exercise of fair use rights. Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[1201(c)(1)] simply clarifies that the DMCA
targets the circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in
circumvention tools), but does not concern itself with the use of those materials after
circumvention has occurred.”); id. at 459 (“Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of
access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user’s preferred technique or in
the format of the original.”).
52. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001);
Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1913–14 (“If any use that allows a person to
get for free something she would otherwise need to pay for is a commercial one . . . then
most lawful unlicensed uses would be commercial.”).
53. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799–805 (6th Cir. 2005)
(interpreting the Copyright Act’s limitation on the scope of the sound recording copyright as
a reason for giving owner of a sound recording copyright the exclusive right to sample the
work).
54. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d
Cir. 2008) (concluding cable company operator of off-site DVRs was not directly liable for
creation of copies ordered by customers because “volitional conduct is an important element
of direct liability”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009).
55. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887–95 (2007).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE,
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 7 (2008). Copyright skepticism predates the 1976 Act.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970) (“Taken as a
whole, the evidence now available suggests that, although we should hesitate to abolish
copyright protection, we should equally hesitate to extend or strengthen it.”).
57. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
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critique is the positive observation that the world of rights set forth under
current copyright doctrine bears only a tangential relationship with the way
content users live their lives. Regardless of what the lawyers say, blithe
copyright infringements fill our daily lives.58
To this claim, one might ask, “So what?” After all, most of these
infringements go unnoticed, let alone litigated. And it is true that rights
holders are unlikely to pursue the broadest possible copyright claims
against individual users.59 Such litigation may be a financial loser,60
provoke a public backlash, or face unsympathetic judges who may balk at
extreme claims, even if the reason for balking is unclear.61
Even so, the current mismatch between norms and law is problematic. It
might sow disregard for provisions of the copyright statute that would
otherwise be perceived as legitimate, or, worse, undermine the rule of law
in general. More pragmatically, even underenforced law may deter users
who wish to engage in socially beneficial activities, but fear potential
litigation. The law/norm mismatch also feeds the impression that certain
copyright uses, which arguably should be (or are) legal, exist only as the
product of benevolence on the part of rights holders. For many copyright
critics, this impression is precisely the problem.62 After all, when the rights
holder claims, “This is infringing, but I’ll let it go,” the consumer lacks the

58. See Tehranian, supra note 5, at 543–48.
59. Though it bears noting that the RIAA’s litigation campaign targeted a large number
of downloaders. Nate Anderson, Has the RIAA Sued 18,000 People . . . or 35,000?, ARS
TECHNICA (July 8, 2009, 2:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/hasthe-riaa-sued-18000-people-or-35000.ars. And sometimes the wrong target is hit. See, e.g.,
Nate Anderson, Using Faulty Data to Demand Settlements from Innocent Surfers, ARS
TECHNICA (Nov. 30, 2009, 7:22 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/
11/using-faulty-data-to-demand-settlements-from-innocent-surfers.ars.
60. Steven Marks, RIAA Responds: Nesson More like P.T. Barnum than David, ARS
TECHNICA (May 31, 2009, 11:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/05/riaaresponds.ars (op-ed by Recording Industry Association of America general counsel arguing
that litigation against file sharers has lost money). But see Nate Anderson, The RIAA?
Amateurs.
Here’s How You Sue 14,000+ P2P Users, ARS TECHNICA,
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/06/the-riaa-amateurs-heres-how-you-sue-p2pusers.ars (last updated June 2010) (describing pursuit of copyright litigation as business
model of “the US Copyright Group, a set of lawyers who have turned P2P prosecution into
revenue generation”).
61. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. And, of course, rights holders have an
incentive to resist litigation declaring a user’s rights ex ante. See, e.g., Shloss v. Sweeney,
515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080–82 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting copyright holder’s motion to
dismiss author’s action seeking declaratory judgment that planned use of copyrighted
materials would be legal); Edelman v. N2H2, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 137, 137–39 (D. Mass.
2003) (holding that plaintiff who sought declaration of right to reverse engineer Internet
blocking software lacked standing).
62. Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1920 (arguing that even if
unenforced, an expansive view of the statute is distortive because it “encourages copyright
owners to expect too much, and . . . . snookers judges into reinterpreting the language of the
statute to give effect to the perceived intent of Congress, expanding copies to include RAM
copies, and commercial uses to include any use a copyright owner might otherwise charge
for” (footnotes omitted)).
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incentive or ability to mount a vigorous defense. The cumulative effect of
such assertions, however, may distort copyright policy.
Perhaps the greatest danger of the tolerated use approach is that it aids
efforts to use copyright law to control technologies that may be used to
“infringe.” This is not a new problem,63 but litigation continues over the
extent to which the providers of technological tools may be liable for the
purported infringing activities of their customers.64 And the argument that
the public engages in a vast amount of infringement shapes public debate
over technology policy.65 Providers of technologies used to interact with
copyrighted materials who want to avoid charges of aiding infringement
face pressure to limit their products’ availability or functionality,66 or to
introduce anti-piracy technologies that raise technical or privacy concerns.67
3. The Problem of Personal Use
Copyright presents particular problems with respect to personal uses of
copyrighted material. As the online world continues to expand, everyday
activities are more likely to implicate the copyright statute because so many
interactions with digital content might constitute an unauthorized
“reproduc[tion],”68 “performance,”69 or “display”70 of a copyrighted work
and because so many digital technologies rely on copying for their
63. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
64. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099,
1100–04 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Endangered Gizmos, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
http://w2.eff.org/endangered/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). Most prominently, YouTube is in
litigation with copyright holders as to whether it does enough to prevent the uploading of
infringing content.
65. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 705–08 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (striking
down FCC’s broadcast flag regulation); Matthew Lasar, Warner Video Shows Hollywood
Doesn’t Need HDTV Blocking, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 5, 2009, 2:11 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2009/11/warner-video-shows-hollywood-doesnt-needhdtv-blocking.ars (describing movie industry efforts to obtain authority to block analog
outputs of home electronic devices).
66. See, e.g., Eric Bangeman, Schools Take Wait-and-See Approach After Ohio U Bans
P2P Traffic, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 27, 2007, 12:31 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2007/04/schools-take-wait-and-see-approach-after-ohio-u-bans-p2p-traffic.ars
(reporting on Ohio State University’s decision to ban file sharing programs after RIAA
identified the school as a leading site for copyright infringement).
67. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Deep Packet Inspection Under Assault over Privacy
Concerns,
ARS
TECHNICA
(May
12,
2008,
1:03
PM),
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/05/deep-packet-inspection-under-assault-fromcanadian-critics.ars (discussing privacy and net neutrality concerns surrounding deep packet
inspection technology).
68. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a copy is created for purposes of the Copyright Act when a program is loaded
from a disc into a computer’s RAM in order to operate the program).
69. See, e.g., Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 WL
79311, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) (finding violation of performance right where
defendant provided an “unauthorized ‘link’ to . . . live webcasts”).
70. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159–62 (9th Cir.
2007) (discussing display right in Internet context).
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operation. Copying is not only more likely online; it is more detectable and
traceable.71 And technological controls like digital rights management
create the potential for greater use of metering arrangements. That is,
content providers may license their works for single uses rather than
providing copies for repeated reading or other consumption by the
purchaser. Whatever the merits of such efforts, they have the potential to
run counter to consumer expectations.72
Setting aside debates over the harm done by modern technology to the
core markets of copyright holders and the proper policy response,73 many
modern personal uses are the sort that were traditionally not the concern of
copyright law. Children who once would have played Batman in the
schoolyard may now create Batman-like avatars online, provoking litigation
against the providers of the digital playground.74 Broad interpretations of
copyright law now endanger interactions with copyrighted material that
never posed a legal problem in the past, upsetting the previous balance of
interests between copyright creators and users. As noted above, even if
actual suits against individual consumers are rare, the legal characterization
of personal uses as infringing but for copyright holder indulgence has
ramifications for the ability to create tools that may be used to interact with
the digital world more generally.75
71. The DMCA provides procedures for a copyright holder to obtain a subpoena to force
an Internet Service Provider to give identifying information regarding alleged infringers. 17
U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006). And the music industry has used services that connect to peer-topeer networks to search for Internet Protocol addresses of the hosts of protected material.
These addresses then become the basis of subpoenas. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Thomas
Judge Bars Fair Use Defense, OKs MediaSentry Evidence, ARS TECHNICA (June 11, 2009,
5:12 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/thomas-judge-bars-fair-usedefense-oks-mediasentry-evidence.ars; Nate Anderson, MediaSentry Weighed in the
Balance, Found Wanting, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 5, 2009, 5:25 AM), http://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/news/2009/03/mediasentry-weighed-in-the-balance-found-wanting.ars;
Eric
Bangeman, Marshall University Fails to Block RIAA’s P2P Subpoenas, ARS TECHNICA (Apr.
16, 2008, 7:15 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/04/marshall-universityfails-to-block-riaas-p2p-subpoenas.ars.
72. See, e.g., Eric Bangeman, DirecTV DVR Clampdown: A Sober Reminder of DRM
Suckitude,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Mar.
20,
2008,
8:27
PM),
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/03/directv-dvr-clampdown-a-sober-reminder-ofdrm-suckitude.ars (reporting that subscribers to DVR service were advised that functionality
of DVRs would be compromised so that recorded pay-per-view movies would become
unwatchable after twenty-four hours).
73. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, “Fair Use” Generates Trillions in the US Alone, ARS
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/fair-use-generates-trillions-inthe-us-alone.ars (last updated April 2010); Julian Sanchez, 750,000 Lost Jobs? The Dodgy
Digits Behind the War on Piracy, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 7, 2008, 11:30 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/10/dodgy-digits-behind-the-war-on-piracy.ars.
74. See Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253RGKPLAX, 2005 WL
878090, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2005) (litigation over computer game allowing users to
create and play with superhero characters that alleged that resulting characters infringed
copyrights). This is not to say that kids shouldn’t get out more.
75. Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1877 (cautioning that after its victory
over Grokster, the record industry increased efforts to halt CD burning while “both the
motion picture industry and the recording industry seek laws requiring consumer electronics
companies to incorporate copy prevention technology into digital televisions and radios.
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Although traditional conceptions of copyright law carved space for
personal uses,76 these openings have not kept pace with evolving doctrine.
Today, many commonplace personal uses appear to be legally questionable
notwithstanding their routine quality.77
B. Reform Difficulties
Addressing the problems identified by the last section through the courts
is difficult. First, as currently applied, the fair use doctrine is unlikely to
live up to the promise of the breadth of its language. Second, the Copyright
Act’s mismatch between copyright rights and limitations is a fact of text
that judges implementing the Copyright Act cannot ignore.78
1. The Limitations of Fair Use
The fair use doctrine appears to provide precisely the sort of open prodefendant statutory language that the Copyright Act otherwise lacks. Fair
use shields certain uses of copyrighted material even when they nominally
fall under the scope of the exclusive rights granted by section 106.79
Congress codified fair use, which had been a judicial creation, in its 1976
copyright revision.80 The term nonetheless remains undefined; the statutory
factors, imprecise. This vagueness was deliberate, as Congress intended

Thus, the effort to capture control over personal uses is moving further and further into
consumers’ homes.”).
76. See id. at 1883–93 (describing cases protecting user copyright liberties).
77. Id. at 1872 (“Every time a study of copyright law queries the scope of lawful
personal use, it concludes that the answer to the question whether any particular personal use
is lawful is indeterminate.”); id. at 1897–98 (describing routine personal uses in which
author and her circle engage and noting their ambiguous legal status).
78. A third possibility, invoking the First Amendment, is difficult insofar as the Supreme
Court has generally taken the view that the fair use doctrine in conjunction with limitations
on copyrightable subject matter provides a built-in safeguard against copyright’s intruding
on free speech. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“[W]hen . . . Congress has
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny
is unnecessary.”). But see Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1192–94 (10th Cir. 2007)
(concluding that restoration of copyright in certain foreign works required First Amendment
scrutiny); Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1090–94 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
restoration survives intermediate scrutiny).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
80. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5679
(“Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over
again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible . . . .”); see also
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.) (No. 4,901) (“This is
one of those intricate and embarrassing questions . . . in which it is not, from the peculiar
nature and character of the controversy, easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to
lay down any general principles applicable to all cases.”). Calling the defense “equitable”
raises some hackles. Compare Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (characterizing fair use as “entirely equitable”), with 4 PATRY, supra note
43, § 10:3 (“Fair use is not an equitable doctrine or an equitable defense. As history reveals,
it is a legal defense which may, and frequently is, decided by a jury . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
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that courts continue the common law development of the doctrine that had
preceded its codification.81
Several aspects of fair use limit its ability to mitigate copyright’s
expansion or provide clear protection for personal use.82 Most importantly,
its unpredictability provides little ex ante certainty about its application.83
The Supreme Court has consistently cautioned against looking to the
doctrine for categorical rules, instead directing case-by-case application.84
The ambiguity benefits copyright owners because courts treat fair use as
an affirmative defense whose establishment is the defendant’s problem.85
And personal uses that cannot be characterized as new authorship are not
easily accommodated. Several scholars note that copyright law tends to
consider the merits of non-consumptive users through the restrictive prism

81. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680 (“[T]here is
no disposition to freeze the doctrine . . . . Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what
fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”).
82. “[I]f we limit our conversation to a room full of copyright lawyers and copyright
scholars, fair use remains a doctrine that permits a relatively narrow swathe of exceptional,
rather than everyday, uses.” Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 590–91.
83. The divergence of scholarly opinion over the legality of artist Shepherd Fairey’s use
of an AP photo as raw material for the iconic Barack Obama “Hope” poster nicely illustrates
fair use’s uncertainty. See generally Dave Fagundes, Art, Licensing Markets, and the Limits
of Unauthorized Appropriation, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 23, 2009), http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/07/art-licensing-markets-and-the-limits-of-unauthorizedappropriation-shepard-fairey-conversation-at-th.html (blog post detailing conflicting
opinions of various law professors). The frequent uncertainty raised by assertions of fair use
rights supports Lawrence Lessig’s quip describing fair use as little more than “the right to
hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY 187 (2004).
84. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not to
be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for
case-by-case analysis.” (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 560 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448
& n.31 (1984); 1976 Copyright Act’s legislative history)). To be fair, ’twas ever thus.
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344 (“This is one of those intricate and embarrassing questions . . . in
which it is not, from the peculiar nature and character of the controversy, easy to arrive at
any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all cases.”).
The Supreme Court did hold in Sony that recording television in order to “time-shift”
program viewing was fair. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455–56. Some express doubt, however, that the
case would be decided the same way today. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 590 (“In the
question-and-answer session following Paul Goldstein’s keynote speech at this symposium,
an audience member asked whether Sony would be decided the same way today. Professor
Goldstein was confident that it would not, and nobody in the audience took issue with his
conclusion.”). And some opinions contain suggestions to the same effect. In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing use of a recording
device to skip commercials as the creation of an unauthorized derivative work).
85. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper, 471 U.S. at 561. One could read section 107 as
placing the burden of demonstrating that the challenged use is not fair on the plaintiff. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”). That’s not the way the
Supreme Court sees it.
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of authorship.86 This view treats the user as another author who builds on
prior works. In this conception, courts balance an author’s interest in a
strong copyright against her need for access to a public domain that fuels
further creativity.87 But copying can serve interests—such as autonomy
and non-authorial self-expression—that extend beyond fodder for fresh
authorship.88 Modern fair use doctrine has relatively little to say about such
uses.89
2. The Matter of the Text
Fair use’s shortcomings have not curbed academic enthusiasm for
judicial intervention to curtail copyright’s scope. But if fair use is at least
partially off the table, what can judges do?90
The question implicates larger debates over the proper judicial role in
statutory interpretation. Jessica Litman objects that copyright scholars have
abetted copyright’s expansion by uncritically accepting a view of the
Copyright Act as nominally giving rights holders all that they might want.
An unduly literalist view of the statute leads to an almost perverse delight at
the extremity of the resulting conclusions.91

86. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 405
(2003).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., id. at 406–20; Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2005); Tushnet, supra note 57, at 562–82.
89. Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 177 (2007)
(“Fair use is much too busy protecting The Wind Done Gone and trying to figure out what to
do with Google Book Search to be able to support the copyright interests of millions of
everyday readers, listeners, and viewers.”).
90. Professor Litman proposes a range of options while favoring a focus on what
Congress intended to be understood about its enacted rights:
An individual who rips a CD to her iPod, turns on her brother’s computer, fast
forwards through objectionable portions of a television show or DVD, or plays
music with the windows open isn’t violating the copyright law, despite the plain
language of § 106. People disagree on the rationale. It might be fair use; it might
be implicitly licensed by copyright owners; it might be that the harm caused by
each consumer is de minimis, or it might be, as I argue, that Congress intended the
§ 106 rights to be interpreted subject to the understanding that copyright prohibits
unauthorized exploitation but not unauthorized enjoyment.
Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1908 (footnote omitted). In a sense, the
argument favored by this Article parallels this final comment, but seeks to doctrinally ground
it in the common law of property and Congress’s failure to explicitly override it. See infra
Part III.A.
91. Professor Litman states:
Section 106 means what it says, we tell our students. Any reproduction, creative
alteration, or distribution, any performance or display outside of the home, we tell
them, is copyright infringement unless it comes within some statutory or judgemade exception. We are even kind of gleeful at the implausible results that follow
from the premise. “That’s how the statute sets things up,” we say, as if our hands
were tied.
Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 89, at 180; cf. id. at 181 (“Copyright owners . . . have
seized on the expansive literal reading and made it their own. Some courts are enforcing it,
and copyright scholars are questioning it only faintly and half-heartedly.”).
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It may well be true that courts have run with the Copyright Act’s
language in a manner that the drafters of the 1976 Act never
contemplated,92 but that is hardly a litigation trump if courts do not care
about legislative history, at least where textual signposts are roughly
discernable.93 This is especially so if we are in a jurisprudential moment
that elevates textualist methods of interpreting statutes at the expense of
alternative tools of construction, particularly those that seek to recapture the
intentions of Congress and implement the legislature’s purpose.94 This
characterization is debatable, both generally and in copyright case law in
particular.95 And in any case, statutes contain many ambiguous or vague
terms that require judicial construction, opening the door to pragmatic
considerations.96

92. See, e.g., id. at 180; Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1907 (“Congress
has consistently viewed copyright as securing copyright owners’ opportunities to exploit
works without invading individuals’ liberties to enjoy works.”).
93. For example, Professor Litman notes that Congress intended the Audio Home
Recording Act to give consumers a “free pass to make any copies of recorded music that
technology would allow.” Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 590 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102873(I), at 24 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3594; William F. Patry, Section
1008,
PATRY
COPYRIGHT
BLOG
(Aug.
17,
2005,
9:44
AM),
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08/section-1008.html). In isolation, the provision
looked to have done the job. Section 1008 provides:
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based
on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device,
a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog
recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a
device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical
recordings.
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006). Unfortunately, the statute elsewhere gives restrictive definitions of
“digital audio recording device” and “digital audio recording medium” so as to limit the
exemption provided by the American Home Recording Act (AHRA) such that it does not
apply to the vast majority of devices used to make digital music recordings. Id. § 1001. For
his part, Patry writes, “[O]ur subjective intention and that of the Committee, expressed in the
Committee report, was to exempt all noncommercial private copying. Because we failed to
express that intention in the statute, I accept that our intention is irrelevant.” Patry, supra.
As Professor Litman notes, judicial neglect of Congress’s intent applied not only to
section 1008, but to attempts to appeal to the animating principle in the fair use context.
“Eight years [after the AHRA], Napster sought to make precisely those arguments: that
consumer copying of recorded music was either fair use under Sony, permissible under the
Audio Home Recording Act, or both. The court didn’t think the arguments merited serious
consideration, and resolved them against Napster summarily.” Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at
590 (footnotes omitted).
94. See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note 42, at 929 n.152 (collecting sources). To say that
there may be a greater reliance on textualist methodology is not to say that other
considerations do not continue to inform statutory interpretation. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS,
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 158 (2009).
95. See 1 PATRY, supra note 43, § 2:37 (collecting examples of legislative history use in
copyright cases and contending that “[r]egardless of the polemical effect of Justice Scalia’s
attacks on legislative history, an empirical study of the use of legislative history in copyright
cases demonstrates that Justice Scalia’s criticism has had no discernible effect”).
96. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 44, at 196-98 (discussing delegating and non-delegating
statutes).
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But sometimes Congress speaks clearly. It is the textual mismatch
between those statutory provisions that expand copyright’s scope and those
that limit it that creates the most mischief.97 Textual checks to copyright—
fair use aside—lack the openness of those terms that empower copyright
holders. Courts may be mistaken to equate the loading of software from a
disc with an actionable reproduction,98 but the breadth of the Copyright
Act’s definition of “copies” makes it hard to claim that they are usurping
Congress’s authority.99 Copyright restrictionists may not lose every battle,
and perhaps a good deal remains up for grabs, but the statute’s broad scope
requires them constantly to play defense.
Opportunities for offense are more limited. Restrictive doctrines need
some legal basis. If fair use is limited, then those who would craft doctrines
to limit copyright are at a disadvantage. It is well and good to argue that
non-commercial use of music should be legal as a matter of policy,
legislative intent, or the underlying purposes of copyright.100 But it is a
good deal harder to claim that it is legal. In light of the specificity of the
statute’s textual exclusions, courts appear to have scant room to
improvise.101
C. The Promise and Limitations of Implied Licenses
In response to the problems of fair use, some copyright restrictionists
suggest expanding the use of implied licenses. This approach’s promise is
limited by the doctrine’s strong focus on copyright holder conduct. It is too
easy for copyright holders to “revoke” any implied license.
1. Implied Licenses Generally
Implied licenses traditionally fill gaps in contracts where the failure to
accommodate copyright’s peculiarities might deprive a party of the benefit
of her bargain.102 A copyright is distinct from the object that embodies the
97. See supra Part I.A.1.
98. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining copy as a material object “in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device”).
100. See supra note 93.
101. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 367 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J., dissenting)
(noting that “some scholars, myself included, have suggested that it might be a good idea
if . . . courts were permitted to read the law according to what they perceived to be the will
of the current Congress, rather than that of a long-gone-by one,” but conceding that “such an
arrangement in the abstract . . . is simply not a part of our legal system” (citing GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982))).
102. Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright
Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 276–77 (2009) (commenting that
in copyright law, implied license resolves “two conflicts: the tension between the owner of a
tangible object in which a work is incorporated and the owner of the copyright for that work,
and the tension between the creator of a work (and/or the copyright owner) and his or her
transferee (e.g., the work’s commissioner)”).
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protected expression, and copyright transfers must satisfy a federal statute
of frauds.103 This complicates transactions for the careless and unaware. A
movie producer might commission copyrighted material for inclusion in a
film, but neglect to obtain a written transfer of copyright or secure a workmade-for-hire agreement.104 In response, a court may imply a license to use
the work to implement the intention of the parties.105
Courts also use implied licenses to vindicate reasonable consumer
expectations.106 Implied license enables the purchaser to use his purchase
in a reasonable manner even if the use necessitates treading upon a
protected copyright right.107
These two patterns characterize the bulk of implied license cases.108 In
both, the implied license can be found in the intent of the copyright owner,
and that is where the doctrine focuses its attention.109
Several commentators recommend broadened reliance on implied
licenses as a means of harmonizing copyright doctrine with user norms.110
Some of these recommendations apply traditional implied license reasoning
to the Internet context. They focus on the reasonable implications of direct
interaction between the copyright holder and the “licensee.”111 Others are
103. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is
embodied.”); id. § 204 (“A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law,
is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is
in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized
agent.”).
104. Id. § 101 (defining work made for hire); id. § 201(b) (vesting copyright ownership in
employer for works made for hire).
105. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
copyright holder’s creation and delivery of work at request of moviemaker constituted an
implied license for use of the work in defendant’s film); 2 PATRY, supra note 43, § 5:131.
106. Many such expectations have since been protected by statute. The traditional firstsale doctrine, codified by the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909) (repealed 1976), preserved the
ability of purchasers of copyrighted works to “sell or otherwise dispose” of them. 17 U.S.C.
§ 109; see 4 PATRY, supra note 43, § 13:19.
107. For example, the sale of a computer program may carry with it a license to copy its
contents into the computer (rather than simply running the program off of a CD). As Patry
explains:
[P]urchasing a used CD cannot be deemed to convey an implied license for
reproduction. By contrast, sale and purchase of a computer program does convey
an implied license for internal reproduction because the purpose of the program is
use in a computer, a use that necessitates the making of a copy (at least during
installation, and likely repeatedly thereafter in RAM storage), a right reserved to
copyright owners.
2 PATRY, supra note 43, § 5:131; see also 17 U.S.C. § 117.
108. See Afori, supra note 102, at 281.
109. 2 PATRY, supra note 43, § 5:131 (“Under the classic implied license, the author
actually creates the work for the defendant, intending the defendant to use the work . . . .”).
110. See, e.g., Afori, supra note 102, at 290; Raghu Seshadri, Bridging the Digital
Divide: How the Implied License Doctrine Could Narrow the Copynorm-Copyright Gap,
2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3; John S. Sieman, Comment, Using the Implied License to Inject
Common Sense Into Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 921 (2007).
111. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 38, at 20 (“By virtue of the business transaction that
led to ownership of the CD-ROM, the buyer of Nimmer on Copyright has an implicit license
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more ambitious and suggest that implied licenses can bridge the gap
separating copyright practices from the norms that have evolved among
users.112
2. The Limitations of Implied License
These latter proposals may falter when faced with transactions outside
the bilateral setting of traditional implied license doctrine.113 Sometimes
non-face-to-face transactions may be akin to traditional cases. For example,
an Internet user may reasonably assume that a website’s public status
conveys a license to engage in copying activities that are necessary to view
it.114 But what if such assent cannot be inferred or is explicitly withheld?
The primary problem with increased reliance on implied licenses is the
doctrine’s focus on licensor intent. The potential of implied licenses is
limited indeed if a copyright owner can negate any prospective license
simply by affixing a notice that prohibits duplication. But that’s what
current precedent suggests.115
Recognizing the problem, Orit Fischman Afori proposes removing
implied license from its contractual roots.
Once the doctrine is fully acknowledged as a pure judicial standard for
infusing reasonableness into intellectual property law without the need to
track the subjective or even the objective intent of the copyright owner, it
will pave the way for the emergence of an implied license doctrine as a
key principle of intellectual property law. 116

In calling for implied licenses to inject a reasonableness criterion into
copyright, Professor Afori notes that most discussions of broadening the
role of implied license in copyright doctrine have hewn to a traditional
contractual framework.117 And for good reason. Reliance on traditional
contract law principles gives implied license a legal basis. Abandoning that
framework leaves proponents with a legitimacy difficulty.
Professor Afori’s response is to treat the term “implied license” as a
starting point that may then be elaborated into a “pure judicial standard for
infusing reasonableness” through common law decision making that treats
to boot up; Jolly Roger does not.”); id. at 32 (suggesting similar reasoning for forwarded email).
112. Seshadri, supra note 110, at 30, ¶ 59.
113. Cf. Janis, supra note 2, at 499–500 (discussing implied licenses of intellectual
property in bilateral settings).
114. See, e.g., id. at 501 n.460.
115. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Courts have found implied licenses only in ‘narrow’ circumstances where one party
‘created a work at [the other’s] request and handed it over, intending that [the other] copy
and distribute it.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
116. Afori, supra note 102, at 290.
117. Id. (“To date, however, the few scholars who have focused on the potential of the
implied license doctrine as a means to resolve many of the current problems in copyright
law, especially in the context of the Internet, have stuck to the doctrine’s traditional
contractual framework.”).
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the phrase “implied license” as a metaphor.118 This begs the question,
discussed above, of whether courts have the authority to engage in such
flights of creativity.119
Implied licenses face another difficulty. A copyright holder’s ability to
revoke licenses reintroduces the problem of tolerated use.120 Treating
certain uses as tolerated reinforces the perception that copyright holders can
(and should) control how users employ the works.121 What is needed is a
basis for the doctrine that is not wholly dependent on the rights holder’s
behavior. Traditional conceptions of implied licenses cannot play this
role.122
II. PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW BASELINE
There is another basis for protecting personal use, but the Copyright Act
is the wrong place to look. Copyright law—and intellectual property law
generally—operates by interfering with common law property rights.
Though this observation is the basis of several critiques of intellectual
property regimes, there have been relatively few efforts to integrate it into
copyright doctrine. The first step is to appreciate that user property rights
in the tools used to interact with copyrighted material are part of the
common law baseline that copyright law alters. Judges often note that
courts should interpret statutes in harmony with the preexisting common
law absent clear legislative text to the contrary. This truth has been used to

118. Id. at 290; id. at 295 (“Why, then, use the term ‘implied license,’ which clearly
indicates a contractual concept? One way of answering this question is to regard the
introduction of the implied license doctrine into copyright law as a metaphor.”); id. at 297
(“[T]raditional use of the implied license doctrine was to infuse reasonableness into
intellectual property law when the contractual framework enabled it. Thus, an almost natural
evolution of this doctrine would be to keep its aim, tradition and terminology, despite
moving it out of the contractual framework.”).
119. See supra Part I.B. Professor Afori analogizes her approach to what courts have
done with certain open terms in the statute. Afori, supra note 102, at 298–99. But those
terms have the benefit of actually being in the statute. Professor Afori contends that implied
license doctrine is nonetheless legitimate because the concept is already a part of copyright.
Id. at 299 (“The proposed new meaning of the implied license doctrine fits the existing
pattern of evolution in copyright terminology described above, since it builds on an already
existing copyright term which is still not fully or clearly defined.”). That may be, but in its
traditional conception the doctrine has plausible legal bases in traditional contract and
licensing principles. If detached from that foundation, as Professor Afori proposes,
something new is needed if the revised doctrine is to stand.
120. See supra Part I.A.2.
121. Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 89, at 179 (“Relying on implied license to
permit fan fiction and fan video reinforces the obvious negative pregnant: if it is not the sort
of thing copyright owners have a clear interest in permitting, copyright law should not allow
it.”).
122. Id. at 178 (“[W]e could treat fannish creations as implicitly authorized derivative
works. The implicit authorization flows from releasing a work in the mass media for which
the buzz generated by fannish activity is likely to mean a huge increase in the bottom
line . . . .”). Professor Litman notes that this view would not “undermin[e] the core
understanding that the copyright owner is entitled to decide whether or not to allow fans to
engage in creative embroidery.” Id.
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expand copyright’s scope,123 but it has not penetrated judicial or scholarly
analysis of the potential of implied licenses.
Reading the Copyright Act against the backdrop of preexisting property
rights of copyright users provides a basis for weaving these rights—and the
longstanding norms that they reinforce—into the fabric of copyright law.
First, personal property rights may form the basis of a limiting construction
for the Copyright Act. Second, the common law baseline may serve as a
source for rules needed to fill gaps in the statute.
A. Intellectual Property as Property Regulation
Copyright’s growth has been described as the transformation of a limited
commercial monopoly into a broader property right.124 One finds similar
characterizations in the debate about whether intellectual property is
“property” despite the many differences separating real and personal
property from IP.125 My focus is less on the question whether IP,
specifically copyright, is property and more on the effect of intellectual
property rights—whatever their claim to property status—on the property
rights of others.
To assume, arguendo or otherwise, that intellectual property is traditional
property is to mask its extraordinary character. While governments impose
any number of regulations on our property, intellectual property laws give
private actors regulatory power over the private property of others. Holders
of these “intellectual privileges” may invoke the coercive apparatus of the
state to regulate private conduct.126 And unlike land easements or
servitudes, these intrusions are not bargained for or otherwise avoidable.
They exist as an intrusion into private property rights. This observation has
long formed part of the “moral” critique of intellectual property law,127 but
it has broader implications for the question of user rights.
123. See infra Part II.E.3.
124. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in the New Millennium: Resolving the
Conflict Between Property Rights and Political Rights, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 707 (2001)
(“Copyright, in short, has been changed from a marketing monopoly to a proprietary
monopoly that gives the copyright holder as much control over a copyrighted work as the
title to realty gives the titleholder over a plot of land.”).
125. For a canvass of these differences, see, for example, Bell, supra note 2, at 532–40.
126. See id. at 526–27 (“In particular, the Copyright Act entitles a copyright holder to
enlist agents of the state in prima facie violations of non-owners’ rights. Absent copyright,
we would remain free to employ our persons and property in echo of others. Copyright
sharply limits those, our natural and common law rights.” (footnotes omitted)).
127. See, e.g., THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, 1 SPEECHES BY THE RT. HON. THOMAS
BABINGTON MACAULAY, M.P. 394 (1853), available at http://name.umdl.umich.edu/
ABA0947.0001.001 (“The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the
purpose of giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one
of the most innocent and most salutary of human pleasures . . . .”); Tom G. Palmer, Are
Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal
Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 865 (1990) (“[T]he attempt to generate profit
opportunities by legislatively limiting access to certain ideal goods, and therefore to mimic
the market processes governing the allocation of tangible goods, contains a fatal
contradiction: It violates the rights to tangible goods, the very rights that provide the legal
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B. Three Objections
Not everyone will agree that characterizing intellectual property as an
interference with property (or liberty)128 is productive.
1. Doesn’t All Property Affect Property?
The first objection is to dismiss the claim as banal. Any property right or
legal entitlement may be described as a check on the property of others.129
Take the law of trespass, for example. My freedom to aim my car
anywhere I please ends at your property line.
True enough. But this example assumes that trespass is the proper
analogy for intellectual property infringement.130 Not so.
First, analogizing copyright infringement to trespass overlooks the
impact of intellectual property’s protection of non-rivalrous matter.
Intellectual property may be shared (trespassed upon) by many people at
once without dispossessing anyone. Giving the powers of property to the
owners of non-rival goods radically expands the breadth of those powers
and the number of people likely to be directly affected by their exercise.131
foundations with which markets begin.”); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers:
Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 862
(1993) (“It sounds a lot less pleasant if, instead of saying we are rewarding authors, we turn
the matter around and say we are imposing duties, restricting freedom, and inflicting burdens
on certain individuals for the sake of the greater social good.”). Of course, supporters of
intellectual property rights also make normative claims alongside the utilitarian. See
generally Palmer, supra (discussing normative claims in favor of intellectual property
rights). Others, while agreeing that there is a basis in natural rights arguments for the
recognition of intellectual property rights, argue these same arguments counsel greater
respect for the public’s interest in copying than generally appreciated. See Wendy J. Gordon,
A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993) (“When the limitations in natural
law’s premises are taken seriously, natural rights not only cease to be a weapon against free
expression; they also become a source of affirmative protection for free speech interests.”).
128. This Article focuses on IP’s consequences to property rights, not liberty interests.
See infra note 211.
129. Cf., e.g., Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 719 (1917) (“If A owns and occupies Whiteacre, not only B
but also a great many other persons . . . are under a duty, e. g., not to enter on A’s land.”); id.
at 722 (“all rights in rem are against persons”).
130. Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (“The right to exclude
others is generally one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property. With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central
to the very definition of the property interest.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)
(“‘Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,’ that is, anyone
who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted
work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, ‘is an infringer of the copyright.’”); id.
(discussing and citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006)). Even if trespass provides an arguable
analogy, the question remains whether the analogy is best drawn to trespass to real property
or to chattels, the remedies for which are less absolute. Christina Bohannan, Copyright
Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 983–84 (2007).
131. Cf. Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
61, 95 (2009) (“Why do we differentiate between nuisance and trespass? . . . The concern
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In contrast, third parties generally experience traditional property rights as a
direct restriction when they are in proximity to something tangible.132
Because IP rights reach non-tangible “goods” that may be held
simultaneously by many actors, the powers exercised by the holder of the
entitlement extend beyond those in proximity to a parcel of land or chattel.
Consequently it is often harder to avoid infringing an IP right than a
traditional property entitlement. The information costs of learning what is
permitted are relatively low in the classic trespass setting in which the
regulated party must simply respect a property line. Knowing the boundary
of the permissible is harder when, as in a nuisance case, both property
owners have property claims and the interference, if any, with property
rights is non-possessory in nature.133 Matters may be even more
complicated in the IP context.134
This point can be illustrated with a silly, but not entirely fanciful,
example. Suppose you own both a cat and a laser pointer. Knowing that
Fluffy is fascinated by light, you decide to use the pointer to give her some
exercise. You are not allowed to enter your neighbor’s property to do so.
And if you make too much noise or carelessly aim your beam through your
neighbor’s window he might pursue a nuisance action. If it happens that he
also owns U.S. Patent Number 5,443,036, covering this particular method
of cat exercise, he has the ability to enjoin not only you (even if you pull
your shades), but also every other person who owns both a laser pointer and
a cat.135 Trespass law prevents you from going into your neighbor’s house
for Fluffy’s workout. Nuisance law stops you from making too much noise.
Intellectual property law forecloses the activity, period, but with added
difficulty in determining whether the property right exists in the first
place.136
Second and relatedly, other property doctrines may better characterize IP
rights. Copyrights and patents also function as negative easements.137

raised by such a drastically enforced right to exclude is that landowners would be vested
with tremendous veto power over a wide range of uses for any neighboring land.”).
132. The rivalrous quality of the tangible world creates a zero sum game in some
contexts. Someone has the property; someone does not. Not so with non-rival goods, which
can be held by multiple parties at once. This is not to deny the existence of the utilitarian
case for treating non-rival goods as rivalrous in order to encourage their production.
133. Newman, supra note 131, at 102 (“The ability to accurately identify non-possessory
use conflicts in advance is subject to much greater uncertainty than is the ability to
accurately identify the future need for possessory use of resources.”).
134. See, e.g., id. at 105–06 (“To avoid infringing a patent, it is not sufficient to avoid
appropriating or coming into contact with any particular physical objects . . . . [I]t is only
through extremely detailed evaluation of uses that anyone is able to determine whether or not
actions transgress the ‘boundaries’ of the patent.”).
135. By the way, U.S. Patent Number 5,443,036 is real. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed
Nov. 2, 1993).
136. For example, evaluating whether the patent is invalid due to obviousness or lack of
novelty.
137. A negative easement is an “easement that prohibits the servient-estate owner from
doing something, such as building an obstruction.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
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They limit the rights of others to use their own property. Unlike a
government regulation, these easements are constantly springing into
existence with each patent grant or fixation of an original work of
authorship. This is not to argue that such grants are illegitimate or
unjustified, though there is a rich literature that makes both contentions, but
to note the function of intellectual property law as vesting private actors
with the power (dressed in the property form) to regulate private property.
And the method used—the imposition of de facto servitudes in personal
property—is one that the common law traditionally viewed as suspect.138
Because limiting doctrines, like fair use in copyright law, offer a check to
these powers, much of intellectual property law can be seen as the
mediation between competing property rights. In this an infringement
action may also be seen as a form of nuisance, rather than servitude, law.
Both the infringer and infringee have incompatible, property-backed claims
that need to be reconciled.139 The information costs of avoiding a property
rights violation matter here, too, because of uncertainty as to the scope of
the entitlement, such as the line separating fair use from infringement, or
the extent to which the holder of the entitlement may be reasonably
expected to enforce it.140
2009). I am not the first to characterize IP rights in this manner. Newman, supra note 131, at
68, 106–07.
138. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV.
945, 954 (1928) (discussing failure of such servitudes to take hold in either England or the
United States); id. at 981–82 (citing, but disputing, authority that “‘[i]t is also a general rule
of the common law that a contract restricting the use or controlling subsales cannot be
annexed to a chattel so as to follow the article and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of
notice’” (quoting Park v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907))); Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 906 (2008) (“The conventional wisdom,
as described by contemporary commentators, is that personal property servitudes are seldom
enforceable.”).
139. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979) (calling on court
considering a nuisance claim to weigh the “gravity of the harm [against] the utility of the
actor’s conduct”), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (fair use factors require evaluating the
“purpose and character” of the copyright use and “effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work”).
140. Cf. Van Houweling, supra note 138, at 914–16 (discussing information costs as
possible reason for skepticism of servitudes on personal property). As Professor Newman
observes:
Indeed, when translated into their practical effects on the tangible property rights
of others, IP rights can be seen to constitute a radical departure from the traditional
principle of numerus clausus. IP rights amount to a form of a negative easement—
a restriction on the uses owners can make of their tangible property. They violate,
however, several traditional limitations on such servitudes. At common law, only
a few specific types of activity could be restricted by the use of a negative
easement: conduct that blocked the flow of light, air, or water in an artificial
stream, or conduct that denied support to buildings or structures. These limitations
protected a specific tract of adjacent property, making negative easements
appurtenant by their nature. For the most part, the refusal of the common law to
enforce negative easements in gross against subsequent owners of land has
survived to the present day; while the Third Restatement of Property abandons this
restriction, the recent innovation of conservation easements generally required
specific legislation to make them enforceable. In practice, IP rights are negative
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Nothing in these observations is incompatible with calling intellectual
property “property,” but appreciating the countervailing property rights of
users affects how that property is treated. In a property dispute, it matters
whether the defendant is alleged to have committed a trespass, caused a
nuisance, or violated a servitude. These classification issues are not swept
away by claiming that copyright is property.141
2. Taking the Bitter with the Sweet
A second objection is to dismiss such interferences as irrelevant because
they would not exist but for the creation of the intellectual property in the
first instance.142 That is, your inability to rip a DVD copy of, say, The
Matrix is not much of an interference in your property rights if the film did
not exist prior to its creation, fixation, and protection by copyright. You
have “lost” something that you never had. There are several responses to
this objection. First, IP rights may have the effect of precluding
independent creation. To be sure, in copyright law, unlike patent law,
independent creation negates copyright infringement, and the
idea/expression dichotomy forecloses protection of “any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”143
That does not, however, prevent copyright plaintiffs from attempting to
extend their rights to encompass what may be characterized as ideas,144
easements in gross that are not limited to real property and that can be used to
restrict an extremely broad range of uses. Once acquired, they make servient
estates of every chattel and every person within the territorial reach of the law.
These rights are freely transferable, and there are no requirements that the person
initially acquiring them stand in any sort of privity to the tangible property
burdened or that the interests protected in any way “touch and concern” that
property.
Newman, supra note 131, at 106–07 (footnotes omitted).
141. Tom Bell goes further in response to the banality objection by arguing that the
copyright privilege is inferior by pedigree to the property rights with which it interferes:
Nonetheless, the definition tendered here does helpfully clarify that copyright
holders claim special immunities from the obligations that each of us has, in a state
of nature and at common law, to respect others’ rights to peaceably enjoy their
persons and properties. As Hohfeld would say, in other words, “a [copy]privilege
is the opposite of a duty [to respect others’ natural and common law rights], and
the correlative of a ‘no-right’ [suffered by defendants in infringement suits].” That
offers a more fully and fairly positivist description of copyright, and one more true
to Hohfeld’s project than descriptions blandly observing that all rights limit each
other. To the contrary, our common law and natural rights carry more normative
weight, and thus more legal weight, than the special rights created by the
Copyright Act. A thoroughgoing positivist committed to clarity would therefore
do best to call copyright not simply property, nor (with all due respect to Hohfeld)
a liberty relation, but rather a type of privilege.
Bell, supra note 2, at 530–31 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
142. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 127, at 1566–67 (explaining argument).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
144. See, e.g., RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (allegation that television program Trading Spouses infringed British show Wife
Swap); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974–78 (2d Cir. 1980)
(interpretation of facts surrounding explosion of the Hindenburg).
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facts,145 procedures,146 or methods of operation147 or from asserting their
rights when a defendant claims independent creation in good faith, but may
be responding to the plaintiff’s work on a subconscious level.148
Indeed, the defendant who engages in subconscious copying has suffered
an interference with her creative capacities. This leads to a second response
to the irrelevance objection: the creation of works that receive copyright
protection may leave the public worse off than if they had never been
created. Many copyright holders work hard to ensure the ubiquity of their
works. Their handiwork may displace non-protected alternatives from
public consciousness. Such efforts are unnecessary, however, for a living
culture. Culture in general, and works of authorship in particular, would
exist without copyright. In a world without IP, people would still make use
of these works, with some works becoming more prominent than others.
Just so in our world of copyright protection, except that those who expend
great effort in placing their works at the cultural forefront also try to control
their subsequent use. Participants in cultural life may be in an inferior
position than they would have been absent copyright if, without copyright,
an unprotected substitute would have filled the same cultural niche. Think
of a painter in a field with a blank canvas. It is one thing to tell her, “Don’t
paint my building” if it is a speck in the distance (let’s leave 17 U.S.C.
§ 120 aside for a moment).149 It is quite another if you have paved the field
and your construction dominates the horizon.150
145. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699–702 (2d
Cir. 1998) (copying of page numbers in Westlaw’s printed court reporters is not copyright
infringement).
146. See, e.g., Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 WL
756558, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (concerning yoga sequences claimed to have health
promoting property).
147. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that a spreadsheet menu command hierarchy for a computer spreadsheet program
was an uncopyrightable “method of operation”), aff’d by an equally divided court, 516 U.S.
233 (1996).
148. See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177,
181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (concluding that copyright infringement may be subconscious);
Waldron, supra note 127, at 882–83 (“[A]voiding the sort of subconscious influence that the
judge traced in the Harrisongs case would require the most rigorous and stultifying selfscrutiny. . . . [A] duty to ensure that one is avoiding subconscious imitation in a world
resonating with ‘original’ . . . is in fact very burdensome.”).
149. The statute precludes efforts to use a copyright in an architectural work “to prevent
the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other
pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located
in or ordinarily visible from a public place.” 17 U.S.C. § 120 (2006).
150. Cf. Gordon, supra note 127, at 1568 (“Or consider a landscape photographer. As
each bit of the natural landscape is replaced by buildings, statues, and other human artifacts,
the only way her interest in the common can remain ‘as good’ is if she is given the freedom
to photograph her new surroundings.”). See generally id. at 1567–70 (discussing how IP may
leave the public worse off); Waldron, supra note 127, at 885–86 (“[W]e must address one
another using, not only the resources of a common language and vocabulary, but, in a larger
sense, whatever images and catch-phrases there are in the world, to provide points of mutual
understanding and orientation . . . .”). Professor Waldron also notes the failure of the “no
hardship” argument to account for the prospect that would-be copiers would not see a world
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As a matter of policy, copyright’s incentive to produce works offsets this
displacement effect. Perhaps this deal is a good one for society at large;
perhaps not. But it is a bargain that limits the ability of citizens to use their
property to participate fully in the culture around them.
3. Is Copyright Part of the Common Law Backdrop?
Nor is it an answer to argue that the long history of intellectual property
rights makes them a part of the common law fabric such that we need not
balance competing interests. The Supreme Court long ago made clear that
IP entitlements exist outside the common law property framework.151
Moreover, the fact that federal statutory IP rights have long limited private
property rights does not mean that property-backed expectations do not
without the copyrighted work as the relevant baseline for comparison. In such instances,
they might experience the inability to copy legally as a hardship, one leaving them worse off
than if the work had never been created. Id. at 866–67.
151. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 539 (1852). One might ask whether the existence of state common law copyright
regimes, which protected unpublished works and, later, sound recordings, undermine the
strength of user property expectations. But cf. 1 PATRY, supra note 43, § 1:16 n.2 (“Professor
[Oren] Bracha also states, ‘There is no known American case that applied or even discussed
common law copyright’ in the pre-1790 era.” (quoting Oren Bracha, The Ideology of
Authorship Revisited 44–45 n.116 (Univ. of Tex. Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 82),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=869446)). The answer is no. First, common law rights
were weak, divestible as they were by a work’s publication. LEON H. AMDUR, COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PRACTICE 64 (1936) (“Strictly speaking it is not the fact that statutory copyright
had been acquired which is instrumental in abrogating common law rights, but the fact that
there had been a general publication.”). There was therefore traditionally little room for
action at the state level to shape the property expectations of copyright users. To be sure,
this argument is weaker with respect to the pre-1972 treatment of sound recordings,
depending on whether one views the development of sound recording as a late technology,
compare infra notes 153–57 and accompanying text, or the possibility of state copyright in
non-tangible expressions. Thomas J. Griffin, Common-Law Copyright in the Spoken Word,
32 A.L.R.3d 618, 618 (1970) (discussing limited authority on subject and observing that “the
courts in a number of cases . . . have indicated that an idea or intellectual production is
susceptible of common-law copyright only if it is embodied in writing or otherwise reduced
to tangible form”); see MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.1 (1976)
(arguing against common law tangibility requirement). Second, the protection at state
common law of unpublished works is consistent with the protection of user property rights.
Prior to publication, works embodying creative expression are most likely to be within the
control of their creator. Protecting an author’s rights to such works will generally go hand in
hand with protecting the author’s personal property. AMDUR, supra, at 32 (“The rights of an
author, in his unpublished works, is as much protected at common law as other property in
his possession.”). Once the work is published (and divested of state protection), however,
the competing property claims of the public recipients of the work come into play. See infra
Part III.B.4.b. Even before publication, other property interests required balancing in setting
the scope of common law copyright. Compare, e.g., AMDUR, supra, at 41 (“An absolute,
unqualified sale of the manuscript or other unpublished work passes the entire property
therein, including the common law rights of copy.”), with id. at 44–49 (describing status of
private letters insofar as common law copyright was generally retained by author though title
over physical copy resides in recipient). Third, to whatever extent a state common law
copyright tradition existed, it was excised by the 1976 Act’s removal of publication as a
requirement for copyright protection (with the limited exception of sound recordings created
prior to February 15, 1972). See 17 U.S.C. § 301.
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persist, especially when one remembers that the scope of copyright was
traditionally narrower.152
To see why, consider the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council153 held that a
regulation that effectively “wipes out” a property’s value constitutes a
taking requiring just compensation. The majority allowed that nuisance
control is an exception to the rule, on the logic that property ownership is
understood to encompass the duty to refrain from uses that constitute
nuisances.154 But it limited this exception to regulated conduct that would
have been recognized as a nuisance early in the common law of property.
That is, even though the government traditionally regulated activities that
could be considered nuisances, expanding the reach of such government
regulations does not alter the common law expectations of property
owners.155
Just so with intellectual property law. Although IP entitlements have
long coexisted with common law property expectations, the expansion of
those entitlements in the last century does not rewrite the common law of
property or alter expectations of the legality of longstanding practices.156
Changes in IP’s scope may diminish property rights, but the baseline has an
independent life. So it is even with respect to property that is created and
purchased after applicable IP entitlements are on the books.157
C. The Role of User Property Rights in Modern Copyright Law
Scholarship calling attention to copyright’s role as an interference with
private property generally uses the observation as a springboard for
critiquing copyright law more generally.158 But the “private property”
critique plays only a limited role in actual doctrine. To be sure, the
152. See supra Part I.A.1.
153. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
154. Id. at 1029 (“Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”).
155. Id. at 1031 (explaining that nuisance exception means more than the state’s
“proffer[ing] the legislature’s declaration that the uses [the landowner] desires are
inconsistent with the public interest . . . . [It must instead] identify background principles of
nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses”).
156. Cf. id. at 1031 (“The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly
situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition . . . .”).
Proponents of strong personal use rights make the analogous point that certain unlicensed
uses have long been the norm. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
157. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court held that acquiring property after the date of a
regulation’s implementation does not bar a regulatory takings claim. Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628–32 (2001).
158. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 229 (2003) (“[U]nderstanding copyright as a
form of authors’ welfare suggests the need for, and potential shape of, reforms to end
copyright as we know it.”); cf. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 82–144 (2004) (calling for new defenses to IP liability
based on limits found in traditional property doctrines).
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Copyright Act contains some accommodations to user property rights.159
Most prominently, the first-sale doctrine protects user interests in
copyrighted material to the extent that a lawful copy—i.e., a piece of
personal property—embodies that material.160 One could even describe the
doctrine’s pre-codification emergence as an example of judicial protection
of common law property expectations.161 In this light, the doctrine looks
less like an exception carved from copyright law and more a vindication of
a discrete set of legal interests.
In a similar vein, the Copyright Act limits exclusive rights to perform or
display a copyrighted work by exempting non-public performances and
displays.162 This limitation respects user property rights in two ways. First,
it insulates a wide range of basic personal uses of tangible copies and
phonorecords from legal scrutiny. Second, it protects a user’s right to play
with copyrighted material in the comfort of her own home qua home (i.e.,
not as a staging ground of a commercial enterprise). Section 110’s
carveouts to a copyright holder’s right to control performance and display
of her work respect private property by exempting communication of
transmissions received by “a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly
used in private homes” and by permitting members of households to obtain
edited audio and video content.163 The Audio Home Recording Act’s
exemption of non-commercial analog and certain digital copying of music
is to the same effect.164
Generally speaking, however, user-based private property considerations
play a limited role in copyright doctrine. And what attention there is
focuses largely on property in the copies and phonorecords that embody
protected material.165 Copyright law’s creation of easements in private
property is largely ignored. So much the worse for personal use rights.
Copyright’s claim to be a socially beneficial incentive to create is strongest
when considering the copies of works that copyright protection supposedly
brought forth. The surface case for allowing copyright to interfere with
property rights might appear weaker if the property in question were not so
closely tied to copyright’s purported bounty.

159. The statute’s division of interests between a copyright and a copy may protect user
property rights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (providing that transfer of copyright
ownership does not “convey property rights in any material object”).
160. Id. § 109.
161. And I do. See infra Part III.D.1.a; see also Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies:
Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1302
(2001) (“Put another way, physical copy owner ‘rights’ are defined primarily by the law of
personal property, with copyright law imposing a few limited restrictions. The idea of
physical copy ownership thus seems to provide a simple and intuitively appealing
explanation for the incidents of physical copy ownership.”).
162. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4)–(6).
163. Id. § 110(5), (10).
164. Id. § 1008.
165. Cf. Patterson, supra note 124, at 712–14 (explicating distinction between work and
copyright and how overlooking it broadens the rights of copyright holders).
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The absence of private property considerations from copyright parallels
the relative inattention paid to copyright uses that are neither simple
consumption nor authorial transformation.166 Similar inattention applies to
the user’s personally owned tools that enable copying. Even if courts do
not target individual users of such equipment, a narrow judicial
understanding of legal copyright use may ultimately endanger consumer
access to such products.167
D. Why User Property Rights Matter
Paying more attention to private property rights could aid the future
development of personal copyright use rights. First, common law property
rights provide a legal basis for claiming the existence of user rights
independent of the Copyright Act. Absent a regulation to the contrary, and
subject to the property rights of others, personal property ownership carries
with it the familiar bundle of rights commonly associated with property.
One is free to use, exclude, transfer, gift, sell, or otherwise dispose of her
property as she wishes.168 This is no less true of property subject to
copyright’s negative easements. Stated another way, if the Copyright Act
neglects to give copyright owners the power to forbid a particular copyright
use, users have that right as part of their basic common law rights, not as a
matter of federal neglect or statutory vacuum.169

166. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 86, at 401 (“[C]opyright law contains at least two primary
conceptions of the consumer: the consumer as passive consumer and the consumer as
author.”); supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part I.A.2.; cf. Liu, supra note 86, at 428 (arguing that “courts, in dealing
with new technologies, should acknowledge and give some weight to consumer interests in
autonomy, communication, and self-expression,” particularly when considering if “new
kinds of uses (such as those enabled by new technology like MP3 players, TiVo, ad-stripping
software, and web browsers) constitute fair use”).
168. See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l. Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“The purchaser of a patented article has the rights of any owner of personal property,
including the right to use it, repair it, modify it, discard it, or resell it, subject only to
overriding conditions of the sale.”); City of Tiffin v. McCormack, 34 Ohio St. 638, 644
(1878) (“Undoubtedly, the right to use property as the owner may please, provided that
reasonable care is taken not to do unnecessary injury to others, is the ordinary rule.”);
Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enters., 460 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1969) (“[E]very person has a
right to use his own property as he sees fit so long as that use does not invade the rights of
his neighbor unreasonably and substantially.”); Mayer v. Grueber, 138 N.W.2d 197, 204
(Wis. 1965) (“It is elementary that the owner of private property may make any proper use
of it so long as he does not interfere with the rights of the public.”); 63C AM. JUR. 2D
Property § 1 (2009) (“‘[P]roperty’ [in a thing] does not consist merely in its ownership or
possession, but also in the lawful, unrestricted right of its use, enjoyment, and disposal.”).
169. Cf. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 n.7 (2008)
(citing Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (“Whether a patentee
may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is
not a question before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that
such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent
meaning and effect of the patent laws.”)) (noting that patentees may bargain for use
restrictions on sold products, but such rights cannot arise under patent law).
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Second, and relatedly, user property rights provide the baseline against
which federal copyright law acts. Copyright is a creature of statute.170 But
the Copyright Act cannot answer every question concerning the copyright’s
functioning. Courts must play a role, determining whether settled
expectations remain intact and filling statutory gaps when necessary. As
discussed in greater detail below, when they do, they should do so
cognizant of the common law backdrop against which they interpret the
statute. For user rights, the applicable common law baseline should be
clear: owners of personal property may use their property in a lawful
manner. Absent the interposition of copyright or another limiting doctrine,
the presumption is that individuals have the right to use their property as
they see fit. Longstanding common law property rights are properly part of
any court’s interpretation of what the Copyright Act removes from property
law and what remains.
Last, while this Article leaves aside the question whether copyright
should be described as property, rhetoric matters. The more copyright, or
any exclusive IP entitlement, is characterized as “property” rather than, say,
“monopoly,” so much the better for the holder of the entitlement. Judges
are prone to engage in moralizing once talk turns to a trespass on a
plaintiff’s property.171 Apprehension of copyright’s dual status as an
interference with property rights offers at least a partial corrective to this
temptation.
E. Background Principles and Statutory Interpretation
Background principles of property law may find their way into copyright
doctrine in at least two ways. First, judges could take seriously the
principle that courts do not lightly depart from common law baselines.
Appreciating the baseline rights that copyright users held as property
owners prior to the adoption of the 1976 Act should guide interpretation of
the extent to which the statute supersedes them. Second, judges may draw
from common law principles in filling interstitial gaps in the Copyright Act
with respect to the powers of copyright owners.
1. Departing From the Baseline
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid172 is the textbook example
of the importance of common law principles to statutory interpretation in
170. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
171. As commentators have often noticed:
As one court explained, “The First Amendment is not a license to trammel on
legally recognized rights in intellectual property.” The court did not, however,
examine “the legally recognized rights” and as its smug assertion suggests, a major
harm of copyright as a proprietary monopoly is that it obscures the sacrifice of free
speech rights on the copyright altar.
Patterson, supra note 124, at 719 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979)).
172. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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copyright law.173 In Reid, the Supreme Court looked to the common law to
interpret the meaning of the word “employee” in the statute’s work-for-hire
provision.174
But common law precedents provide more than a statutory glossary.
They form the baseline against which legislatures modify traditional
understandings of rights and entitlements. Given the ubiquity of such
understandings, and the difficulties inherent in drafting legislation that
contemplates every contingency, courts are reluctant to assume that statutes
casually discard well-established legal principles absent a clear legislative
directive. 175
173. For textbook usage, see, for example, ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL &
MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 447 (rev. 4th
ed. 2007).
174. Reid, 490 U.S. at 741 (“[T]he term ‘employee’ should be understood in light of the
general common law of agency.”). Reid could be characterized as an example of federal
common lawmaking. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community
Property, 60 LA. L. REV. 127, 148 (1999) (describing Reid as creating federal common law);
William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 383, 415
(2000) (“This is a common law of a very limited kind, and it may, in fact, be more accurate
to describe the Court’s approach as an interpretation of a statute rather than the creation of a
body of law.”). Federal common law is discussed in greater detail below, so some precision
is required with respect to language. I would draw a distinction between situations in which
courts look to the common law to help define a term as a matter of statutory construction and
the “judicial filling of statutory interstices.” Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964); see also Jay Dratler, Jr.,
Common-Sense (Federal) Common Law Adrift in a Statutory Sea, or Why Grokster Was a
Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 413, 420 (2006)
(“When a statute speaks on a subject and comes close to giving an answer, but requires
extrapolation to new or unanticipated circumstances, statutory interpretation is appropriate.
In contrast, when the statute is silent and the legislative history suggests a huge open
issue . . . federal-common-law analysis is appropriate.”). The line between the two situations
is often hard to draw, as an undefined term is arguably a gap. See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note
42, at 948–53.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (“‘Statutes which invade
the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of longestablished and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident.’ In such cases, Congress does not write upon a clean slate. In order to abrogate a
common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the
common law.” (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)) (citing Astoria Federal Savings & Loan
Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315
(1981))); Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108 (“[W]here a common-law principle is well established . . .
the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the
principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’” (citations
omitted) (quoting Isbrandtsen, 343 U.S. at 783)); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322,
1329 (11th Cir. 2006) (“While the text of [the Class Action Fairness Act] plainly expands
federal jurisdiction over class actions and facilitates their removal, ‘[w]e presume that
Congress legislates against the backdrop of established principles of state and federal
common law, and that when it wishes to deviate from deeply rooted principles, it will say
so.’” (quoting United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 900 (11th Cir. 2003)) (citing
White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1434–35 (11th Cir.
1997))); Duvall v. Attorney Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Congress is expected
to legislate against the backdrop of well-established common law principles. An accepted
common law doctrine should be implied in a statutory scheme, despite the absence of
express authorization, if application of the doctrine is consistent with the structure and
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This principle does work in multiple intellectual property doctrines. In
patent law, the patent exhaustion doctrine survives despite Congress’s
failure to codify it.176 Similarly, the Supreme Court relied on traditional
understandings of equitable remedies to reject the Federal Circuit’s law of
patent injunctions. Instead of a presumption in favor of equitable relief, the
Court demanded a more context-oriented approach in accord with its
conception of traditional injunction law and the principle that “a major
departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly
implied.”177
Unfair competition law, to take another example, has long recognized the
principle that functional matter cannot receive trademark protection. If a
roadside sign uses a spring mechanism to prevent the wind from blowing it
down, for example, the springs may not be trademarked.178 This principle
ran into difficulty because Congress codified a set of defenses to trademark
claims brought by holders of registered incontestable trademarks.179 That
list omitted functionality, creating the danger that an expressio unius
argument could defeat what trademark law had always recognized as a basis
for attacking a trademark’s validity. The Eleventh Circuit resisted that logic
and held that incontestable marks may be canceled on functionality
grounds. The court reasoned that the centrality of functionality to
traditional trademark doctrine engendered doubt that Congress would
lightly (and silently) eliminate it. Instead, the statute (as it stood at the time
in question) made no mention of functionality, making the court “hesitant to
read the Act as limiting the doctrine’s reach” without a stronger textual
signal.180
purpose of that scheme.” (citing Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108–11)); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 764 (10th Cir. 2005) (“It is reasonable to assume
that when Congress granted rights of way for the construction of highways across the
unreserved lands of the West in 1866, it was aware of and incorporated the common law
pertaining to the nature of public highways and how they are established.”). “Clear” in this
context does not mean explicit. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108 (“This interpretative presumption is
not, however, one that entails a requirement of clear statement, to the effect that Congress
must state precisely any intention to overcome the presumption’s application to a given
statutory scheme.”).
176. See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115–17
(2008) (outlining history of patent exhaustion).
177. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (quoting Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)).
178. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2006). On incontestable marks generally, see id. §§ 1065,
1115 (providing that if a registration has become incontestable, “the registration shall be
conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark,
of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the
registered mark in commerce”).
180. Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 1999).
The court explained:
Consequently, the mere fact that functionality is not enumerated in § 1115(b) is not
sufficient to indicate congressional intent to eliminate the defense’s applicability to
incontestable registrations. Indeed, given the absence of any explicit reference to
the functionality doctrine, which is a judicially created concept that predates the
Lanham Act, we should be hesitant to read the Act as limiting the doctrine’s reach.
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2. Filling Interstices
The common law baseline also supplies substance to statutes. The
modern federal “common law” tradition accepts that courts fill statutory
gaps where necessary to implement congressional legislation, particularly in
realms where the federal scheme is pervasive.181 While such gaps are often
filled by borrowing the rule of the state in which the interpreting court sits,
courts also look to principles of general law to fill them, principles that
naturally reside in common law traditions.182
3. Common Law Baselines and Copyright: Secondary Liability
The principles discussed above have already left their mark on copyright.
The Supreme Court has used common law baselines to expand copyright’s
scope beyond the clear terms of its authorizing legislation, reflecting the
importance of the common law both as a basis for limiting the import of the
Copyright Act’s text and as a source of rules to fill the resulting gaps in the
statute.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.183 is primarily
remembered for two propositions: (1) Providers of tools used for copyright
infringement are not liable for contributory infringement based only on
their provision of tools capable of substantial non-infringing uses;184 and
(2) using a VCR to “time shift” broadcast programming is a non-infringing

“The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that
intent specific.”
Id. (quoting Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986)). To be sure, the Fourth Circuit disagreed. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am.,
9 F.3d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1993). Congress ultimately clarified the matter by amending the
statute to include a functionality defense and to incorporate the functionality principle into
the federal trademark statute generally. Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-330, § 201, 112 Stat. 3064, 3069–70 (1998) (providing for “technical corrections”
to the trademark statute). Wilhelm Pudenz was an interpretation of pre-1998 law.
181. See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4514
(1996) (describing “situations in which neither Congress nor the Constitution has provided a
rule of decision for the resolution of a federal question case that is properly within the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts;” in such matters “it can be inferred from
congressional or constitutional intent that the federal courts should supply the necessary rule
of decision by pronouncing common law to fill the interstices of a pervasively federal
substantive framework”); Friendly, supra note 174, at 421.
182. As Caleb Nelson has written, when federal courts engage in common lawmaking and
do not feel constrained to adopt the rule of the local state, they are unlikely to engage in
flights of judicial creativity. Rather, they will craft doctrine with an eye to “general law—
rules whose content is not dictated entirely by any single decisionmaker (state or federal),
but instead emerges from patterns followed in many different jurisdictions.” Caleb Nelson,
The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 503 (2006).
183. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
184. Id. at 442 (“Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.”).
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fair use.185 These decisions would have been unnecessary had the Court
not first determined that the Copyright Act provides a cause of action for
indirect infringement.
To do so the Court had to overcome the statute’s silence on third party
liability, and the Court’s own acknowledgement that the “remedies for
infringement are only those prescribed by Congress.”186 The Court
nonetheless formulated a contributory copyright infringement doctrine.187
While nominally grounded in analogy to the Patent Act,188 the third party
liability rule relied on a line of precedents that based liability on the
defendant’s ability to control the direct infringer’s conduct. The Court
traced these results to basic common law principles of vicarious liability.189
185. Id. at 454–55 (“[W]e must conclude that this record amply supports the District
Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.”).
186. Id. at 431 (“Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, it was
settled that the protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory. The remedies for
infringement are only those prescribed by Congress.” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
187. To be sure, the legislative history contains language suggesting that the Copyright
Act’s reference to the owner’s exclusive right “to authorize” statutorily prohibited uses
opened the door to third party liability. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674 (stating that “[u]se of the phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to
avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers” and using as an example a
lawful purchaser of an authorized motion picture copy who “engages in the business of
renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance”). Sony at least nods in
this direction, though the core of its reasoning on third party liability is elsewhere. Sony, 464
U.S. at 435. And indeed, it is difficult to stretch the meaning of “authorization” to capture
third party liability outside the vicarious liability context. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th
ed. 2004) (defining “authorize” as, “To give legal authority; to empower <he authorized the
employee to act for him>. 2. To formally approve; to sanction <the city authorized the
construction project>.”). In Sony no such supervisory relationship existed with respect to the
VCR maker and its customers, as the Court acknowledged. Sony, 464 U.S. at 437–38 (noting
that in earlier cases “the ‘contributory’ infringer was in a position to control the use of
copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the
copyright owner” but that the present case “plainly does not fall in that category. The only
contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred
at the moment of sale.”). Small wonder then that the Court’s later return to secondary
liability principles in Grokster made no mention of this argument. But see Note, Central
Bank and Intellectual Property, 123 HARV. L. REV. 730, 745 (2010) (arguing that “the
‘authorize’ clause justifies Grokster and liability for intentional contributions, but not
necessarily liability for knowing contributions”).
188. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (in both patent and copyright law “the contributory
infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly
may require the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the
products or activities that make such duplication possible”).
189. Id. at 437 (“In such cases, as in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious
liability is manifestly just, the ‘contributory’ infringer was in a position to control the use of
copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the
copyright owner.”). This conclusion was not inevitable. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994) (rejecting aiding and
abetting suit under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and stating “when Congress
enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant
for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the
plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors”); cf. id. at 193 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When
§ 10(b) was enacted, aiding and abetting liability was widely, albeit not universally,
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The resort to common law principles is clearer still in Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,190 which held that inducing copyright
infringement creates liability under the statute.191 While the Court looked
again to the Patent Act for its standard,192 Grokster based its holding in
precedents grounded in common law third party liability rules: “at common
law a copyright or patent defendant who ‘not only expected but invoked
[infringing use] by advertisement’ was liable for infringement ‘on
principles recognized in every part of the law.’”193 In other words,
traditional common law principles provide the standards for when a
defendant may be liable for the acts of a third party. Although Congress
failed to codify these principles, the Court refused to conclude that silence
equaled abrogation. “Although ‘[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly
render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,’ these
doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and
are well established in the law.”194
Sony and Grokster also look to the common law to fill perceived gaps in
the Copyright Act. Having determined that the statute does not displace
common law third party liability principles, the Court implemented those
very principles to provide content to the contributory infringement cause of
action.195 Because Congress did not legislate exhaustively (or, indeed, at
all) about secondary copyright liability,196 the Court looked to common law
principles (as embodied in the patent statute) for guidance in fleshing out
the statute.197
recognized in the law of torts and in state legislation prohibiting misrepresentation in the
marketing of securities. The courts’ reliance on common-law tort principles in defining the
scope of liability under § 10(b) was by no means an anomaly.” (citations omitted)).
190. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
191. Id. at 919 (“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”).
192. Id. at 936 (“For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent
law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one
for copyright.”).
193. Id. at 935 (quoting Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911)); see also
id. at 934-35 (“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such
evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived
from the common law.”).
194. Id. at 930 (citations omitted) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 434).
195. Dratler, supra note 174, at 421 & n.37.
196. Of course one could argue that the absence of third party liability provisions in the
statute is not an open question in need of a judicially supplied answer, but rather a
congressional directive that third party liability principles do not apply to federal copyright
law. Cf., e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77,
97 (1981) (“But the authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the
authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not
to adopt. . . . The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is
strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an
integrated system of procedures for enforcement.” (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
197. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text; Dratler, supra note 174, at 421
(“Whether invited by Congress or not, the Supreme Court felt it had a duty to recognize and
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III. INTEGRATING USER PROPERTY RIGHTS INTO COPYRIGHT LAW
Just as invocations of common law principles have expanded copyright,
so too may they constrain it. The property rights of copyright users could
vindicate personal use rights in two ways. First, they are the source of a
limiting construction to the rights given copyright owners by statute.
Second, reasonable expectations of a right to use one’s own property
provide the basis of an expanded implied license doctrine.
A. User Property Rights as Limiting Construction
Taking common law personal property rights seriously means courts
should be circumspect in reading the Copyright Act to reach conduct lying
outside copyright’s traditional scope. As discussed above, when legislation
detracts from common law rights, the carveouts need to be clear.198 This
principle provides a legal basis for respecting copyright’s historical
boundaries. Historians of the Copyright Act contend that judges have long
recognized that the statute’s incursions into personal liberty must recognize
and respect the existence of individual user rights. They argue that future
interpretations of copyright should be consistent with those understandings,
especially since nothing in the 1976 revisions explicitly targeted personal
use rights.199 Appreciating the common law baseline provides a doctrinal
basis for this directive when the use in question implicates the user’s
property rights.
This sort of “copyright lenity” is consistent with the nature of copyright.
As discussed above, copyright may be seen as a negative easement on
personal property.200 Servitudes of this sort are traditionally disfavored,
suggesting the need for judicial caution regarding expansive interpretations
of the Copyright Act.201 Indeed, judicial skepticism of personal property
servitudes already has left its mark upon intellectual property doctrine. In
both the patent and copyright realms, judges—not legislators—were

apply the universal principle of law that there are circumstances under which A may be
liable for B’s tort.”).
198. See supra note 175.
199. Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1883–94 (describing older
precedents); id. at 1913 (describing expansion of perceived commercial scope of copyright
monopoly); Patterson, supra note 124, at 706 (“[D]uring the nineteenth, and much of the
twentieth century, copyright was a regulatory monopoly limited to the marketing of works
and could be defined as consisting of limited rights to which a given work was subject for a
limited period of time.”).
200. See supra Part II.A.
201. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 138, at 954 (discussing failure of such servitudes to
take hold in either England or the United States); id. at 981–82 (citing, but disputing,
authority that “‘[i]t is also a general rule of the common law that a contract restricting the
use or controlling subsales cannot be annexed to a chattel so as to follow the article and
obligate the subpurchaser by operation of notice’” (quoting Park v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39
(6th Cir. 1907))).
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initially responsible for crafting the exhaustion and first-sale doctrines that
protected user rights in property that embodied protected IP.202
Attempts to read the post-1976 Copyright Act as forbidding use of
personal property to engage in activities implicating copyrighted matter
must therefore contend not only with traditional property rights but also
traditional views of how copyright law mediates between the private
property interests of copyright users and the entitlements granted to
copyright owners by federal statute. If a copyright holder argues that
today’s Copyright Act abrogates a property right traditionally enjoyed by
users, it should not be enough that the statute hints that copyright sweeps so
broadly. The intent must “‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the
common law.”203
This limiting construction of the statute could ameliorate the difficulties
created by copyright’s overlapping rights and the statute’s mismatching
language with respect to copyright and its limitations.204 If the structure of
the Act places a thumb on the scale in favor of expansive copyright,
common law expectations may provide a counterweight.
One could argue in response that Congress has spoken with the requisite
clarity in section 106’s grant to the copyright holder of “exclusive rights to
do and to authorize” any of the acts protected by the statute.205 Assuming
this argument negates any user claim of a common law “override” to the
contrary, does this mean that the common law baseline is irrelevant? No.
The contention here is not that the Copyright Act does not interfere with the
property rights of users. Rather, the argument is that in situations in which
the scope of that interference is unclear, courts should take into account the
backdrop against which the Copyright Act is operating. There is little
doubt, for example, that the statute gives the copyright holder the exclusive
right to publicly perform a copyrighted work. That does not answer the
question whether consumer-directed retrievals of television programming
from an off-site facility constitute a public performance.206 It is proper to
look to background expectations where an unclear statute is applied to an
unanticipated context that was technically unlikely at the time of enactment.
And if Congress meant to radically rewrite the relationship between
copyright holders and those engaged in non-commercial uses of

202. Chafee, supra note 138, at 955 (“In the United States, although supported by a few
state decisions, [price maintenance licensing requirements] ha[ve] been decisively repudiated
by the Supreme Court even when applied to the subject matter of statutory monopolies.”);
see also infra Part III.D.1.a.
203. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)) (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315
(1981)).
204. See supra Part I.B.2.
205. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
206. See generally Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009); see supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
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copyrighted works, it is reasonable to expect Congress to include a
provision that explicitly says so.207
Moreover, even though section 106 vests certain rights in copyright
holders at the expense of third-party property rights, that does not mean that
those rights have no role to play in the statute’s implementation. The
common law also provides fodder for filling statutory gaps. What it means
for a use to be unauthorized presents such a gap. This opening provides the
basis for the expanded use of implied licenses in copyright law.
B. Implied Authorization: A New Implied License Doctrine
There is no doubt that the Copyright Act intrudes on the common law
property rights of copyright users. Section 106 grants to copyright holders
the exclusive right to reproduce, perform, display, distribute, or make
derivative works from their copyrights and the right to “authorize” such
actions.208 The statute does not, however, explicate fully how authorization
(or its revocation) operates in practice.
Implied license law to date represents an incomplete look to the common
law to fill the gap. Courts incorporated common law principles found in
ordinary contract transactions and licenses concerning rivalrous property to
fill out the meaning and practice of authorization under section 106.209 But
because judges generally have not grappled with copyright’s status as
property regulation, their view of the relevant common law is unduly
narrow.
A complete view would appreciate that authorization operates in a legal
context in which the putative licensee already has the right under the
common law of property to engage in the licensed activity but for the
copyright holder’s (often indeterminate) negative easement in the licensee’s
personal property. As a result, the licensee’s baseline expectations are quite
different than those found in the ordinary licensing context. Traditional
expectations developed under the assumption that the licensee cannot act
but for the permission of the licensor.
Defining and accommodating expectations in the copyright context opens
the door to a richer view of implied licenses than previously contemplated.
In considering the matter, courts must take into account the background
rights and expectations of both sides of the transaction.
This Article proposes that courts may consider challenged instances of
personal copyright use as follows: assuming the user has engaged in
conduct falling under the scope of section 106, the court should consider
whether she had an objectively reasonable expectation that her use of her
own property was legal. This analysis would take into account prevailing

207. See supra Part II.E.1. To the contrary, the statute implicitly endorses noncommercial uses. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (calling for consideration of market effect in fair use
analysis).
208. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
209. See supra Part I.C.1.
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norms with respect to the activity in question as well as any ambiguity
about whether section 106 reaches the conduct. If the defendant user had an
expectation of a right to engage in the activity, the analysis would then shift
to consider whether the copyright holder had taken sufficient steps to assert
his copyright—to “opt-out” as it were from the user’s plans for the
copyright owner’s property210—in a manner that the defendant was
obligated to honor. The remainder of this subpart fits this view of implied
license into the analysis developed above.
1. Taking Intellectual Property’s Uniqueness Seriously
To say that copyright functions as a negative easement on the private
property of copyright users is not to critique copyright’s existence, but
simply to note its character. It is a regulation not only of individual liberty,
but also property.211
If so, then the copyright user’s expectations cannot simply be defined by
the copyright holder’s conduct. Even if we assume arguendo that
copyrights are property, they are not the only property at issue. The
background understanding that one has a right to use one’s own property
(i.e., the tools used to engage in infringement) remains. That is the source
of the copyright user’s authorization or license to engage in what might
otherwise be perceived as an infringing act.212 Rather than require an
authorizing act of the copyright holder, some uses are, in effect, “pre210. See infra Part III.D.2.c; see also Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
617 (2008). Professor Wu cites several examples of situations in which a copyright holder
should have to take action before liability could be possible and argues for greater use of
such mechanisms. Id. at 621–22. His focus is more on why such mechanisms are a good
idea and less on how they may be grounded in existing law.
211. See supra Part II.A; see also Gordon, supra note 127, at 1559–60 (“It is conceptually
untenable to treat ‘property’ and ‘liberty’ as if they were fully separate categories. Every
conventional private property right contains a ‘liberty to use,’ and some liberties are public
property strong enough to keep conventional private property from forming.” (footnote
omitted)).
Keeping in mind the continuity between property and liberty concepts, this Article
focuses on property rights, rather than liberty interests, as a basis for promoting user rights
for two reasons. First, the common law offers a richer tradition of protection of property
rights as a specific body of law than it does a general common law of liberty (for example,
there is no first-year course in “liberty” even though liberty interests are implicated by
courses in property, contracts, etc.). Second, discussion of liberty interests naturally leads to
talk of constitutional protections, specifically freedom of speech. But First Amendment
defenses generally fare poorly in copyright litigation. See supra note 78. But see Jennifer E.
Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463,
465 (2010) (proposing approach “grounded in our understanding of the ‘liberty’ protected by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments” as a “foundation for certain types of uses by
individuals that are integral to those individuals’ identities”).
212. This perspective addresses Professor Litman’s critique of other efforts to rely on
implied license because they focus too much on the perspective of copyright owners rather
than users. Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 89, at 179 (“[B]y ignoring the central
importance of readers, listeners, viewers, and players in the copyright scheme, we have all
but conceded that the essential policy question in determining whether a use of copyrighted
material should be lawful is the way the use looks from the viewpoint of the copyright
owner.”).
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authorized,” especially if the state of the law is such that the user lacks
notice that her property is encumbered by the copyright holder’s
privilege.213
This does not mean that the text of section 106 does not mean what it
says. It remains within the copyright holder’s power to forbid certain
conduct, and she retains the power to revoke licenses that are implied under
the framework discussed here.214 What it does mean, however, is that full
assertion of the copyright holder’s rights may demand that she take steps to
assert that entitlement in an appropriate manner.215
Nor does this mean that anything goes for the user. Having property
does not bring with it the assumption that one can do anything with it. One
must determine the scope of the authorization that stems from owning
property that may interact with copyrighted matter. It is here that norms
respecting permissible uses of copyrighted matter may be integrated into
doctrine. On one end of the spectrum, computer owners may forward email without fear of an infringement claim. At the other end, the owner of a
video camera should know not to videotape the latest Transformers movie
from inside the theater.216 The difference between the two situations is
reflected by existing norms. Room for doctrinal development—for
“infusing reasonableness” into copyright law217—lies between these
extremes.
Other norms may similarly frame a court’s inquiry. For example, norms
treating amateur fan fiction as a reasonable activity also scorn attempts to
commercialize such works—partly due to fear of attracting greater
resistance from holders of the copyright entitlement.218 This suggests that
attempts by the user to commercialize her activities will generally exceed
the scope of her authorization.219 Expanding our conception of implied
licenses to include user expectations of personal property rights allows such
norms room to operate within copyright law.220 Stated another way, the
213. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.14 (2000) (“The benefit of
an unrecorded servitude, including a servitude created by prescription, implication, estoppel,
or oral grant, is subject to extinguishment under an applicable recording act . . . .”); id.
(providing an exception for “a servitude that would be discovered by reasonable inspection
or inquiry”).
214. Though, of course, in traditional property contexts a license may become
irrevocable. See, e.g., Janis, supra note 2, at 510.
215. As is true in the real property context as well. See infra note 253.
216. As a matter of aesthetics if nothing else. See also infra note 301.
217. Afori, supra note 102, at 290.
218. Steven A. Hetcher, Using Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1869, 1884–87 (2009); cf. id. at 1887 (discussing putative norm among
copyright holders that copyright holders will tolerate non-commercial remixes of their works
but noting that “there is an ongoing battle between this more tolerant norm and one that does
not tolerate such uses”).
219. See also infra Part III.D.2.a.
220. It is not uncommon for judges to allow such norms to guide development of the law,
particularly if there is reason to believe that such customs are welfare maximizing. See, e.g.,
Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881). See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW 254 (1991). Ellickson’s account of norms, and the literature it inspired, is perhaps
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permission to use the copyrighted material comes from the user’s
ownership of the tool she uses for the interaction. Whether that perception
is objectively reasonable depends in part on the operative social norm and
on the court’s willingness to honor that expectation as reasonable.221
2. Harmonizing Copyright and Common Law
This view of implied license is consistent with the Copyright Act. So
long as copyright holders retain their exclusive right to “authorize” uses of
copyrighted material covered by section 106, the statutory minimum is met.
But nothing in the statute evinces the intent to override the common law
presumptions that attend ownership of personal property. Traditional tools
of statutory construction favor construing the statute in a manner that
respects these preexisting expectations.222
The Copyright Act does not define the term “authorize” or explain how
authorization is supposed to operate. This gap gives courts room to create
space for preexisting common law private property rights. Those rights, in
turn, supply a backdrop for elaborating how authorization works in
practice.223 And the Act leaves many open questions on this front. What
constitutes authorization? How is it perceived? When is it revoked, and
when should a licensee be deemed as having notice of the revocation?224
removed from the discussion here insofar as copyright owners and users are often not in a
close-knit relationship, though it is worth noting that one of Ellickson’s examples of norm
evolution involves copyright. ELLICKSON, supra, at 258–64. The argument here, in any case,
is directed not to how norms involving copyright evolve, but whether there is a legal basis
for permitting their operation.
Relatedly, Jennifer Rothman has argued that intellectual property norms, or customs
in her account, should be discounted as a basis for doctrinal guidance in part because rights
holders have a disproportionate influence on the shape of custom. Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1957 (2007)
(“The most powerful IP owners have the greatest influence on both the creation and
establishment of IP customs. The end result of this inequitable evolution is that smaller
players in the IP markets and the public at large are inadequately represented by the
emerging customs.”). In my view, the danger comes not from looking to custom, but from
an overly narrow view of whose customs—and whose property-backed expectations—
matter. Cf. id. at 1964 (“Neither the expectations of IP owners or risk-averse IP users should
govern the scope of IP rights.”).
221. There is nothing unusual about leaving a role for courts to interject conclusions as to
whether norm-based expectations are objectively reasonable. Cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (rejecting Fourth Amendment claim despite subjective expectation of
privacy where “respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from such
observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor”);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
222. See supra Part II.E.1.
223. Or, alternatively, for the interpretation and construction of the statutory term
“authoriz[ation].” See supra note 174.
224. One might ask what more Congress could have done to vest—if that was its
intention—absolute authorization rights in the hands of copyright holders. Leaving aside
that no such intention appears in the 1976 Act’s legislative history, see supra note 92 and
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Common law property rights respond to these questions by helping to
define the licensee’s expectations. These expectations are more important
in the copyright context than in other implied license settings. A
straightforward application of traditional understandings of implied licenses
is therefore unsound. In traditional settings, like contract or real property,
the licensee has no reasonable expectation of a license until the putative
licensor acts—for example, there is no contract without a promise; going
onto someone else’s land without permission is trespass.
Copyright is different. Copyright’s non-rivalrousness means that we
cannot simply take as our paradigmatic licensee the rational actor at the
other end of a negotiated, arm’s length transaction. In the copyright
context, the “licensee” is engaging in conduct that would be permissible at
common law. We must therefore consider his expectations to determine
whether notice has been given of the servitude placed upon his property.225
3. Personal Versus Commercial Uses
The logic of the preceding analysis applies to copying in support of both
personal and commercial uses. It is appropriate, however, for courts to
draw a distinction between the two. First, doing so is consistent with
traditional understandings of copyright.226
Second, commercial entities are routinely expected to be aware that their
activities may be regulated in a way that purely private actions are not.227
Just so with respect to implied authorization. An entity that makes its living
off of the commercial exploitation of copyrighted matter should understand
the nuances of the Act and the scope of section 106 in a way that a purely
private actor does not. Depending on the context, however, even a
commercial user may have a reasonable expectation that a use is authorized
notwithstanding the lack of direct contact with the copyright holder.228
Property is property, and commercial entities have reasonable expectations
in their rights to their chattels just as individual users do.

accompanying text, the problem is that Congress was not writing against a clean slate. If it
had, its language could well have been enough. But in light of the common law backdrop
and technical realities of the time, it is not unreasonable to require Congress to have included
language specifying, for example, that “the personal nature of a copyright use is irrelevant to
determining whether an exclusive right of § 106 has been violated.” Lest this seem an
unreasonable requirement, recall that Congress’s failure to disclaim explicitly a contributory
infringement cause of action resulted in its recognition in Sony and Grokster. See supra Part
II.E.3.
225. In the same way that servitude law requires notice, either record or inquiry, for a
servitude to run with the land. See supra note 213.
226. See, e.g., infra note 281 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (“An expectation of
privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar
expectation in an individual’s home. This expectation is particularly attenuated in
commercial property employed in ‘closely regulated’ industries.” (citations omitted)).
228. See infra Part III.D.2.c.
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4. What About the Copyright Owner’s Rights?
Another element to consider is the copyright holder’s “authorization” of
use of his copyright. If the reasonableness of a user’s belief in a right to use
personal property to interact with copyrighted material depends on context,
then the conduct of the rights holder matters as part of this context.
Moreover, if copyright cases are the mediation of conflicting property
claims, then courts should consider the actions of both parties to the
conflict. The copyright holder makes a range of choices that directly affect
the availability of his work. The more a work appears available for use and
unencumbered by restrictions, the more reasonable the user’s belief that she
may interact with it.
a. Create the Work
Most fundamentally, authors choose whether to create the copyrighted
work in the first instance. Since copyright exists to incentivize creation, it
seems perhaps churlish to suggest that an author should be deemed as
consenting to anything simply by the act of creation. But of course she
does. Creation of a copyrighted work leaves the author vulnerable to the
variety of fair uses that may be made of the work. And fair use’s
uncertainty cuts both ways. An author cannot determine ex ante precisely
what uses of her work a court will determine are fair, and she creates
despite that uncertainty.
In many cases the claim that copyright was meant to incentivize the work
in question is suspect.229 In others, the assertion of copyright may follow
from a failure to utilize an alternative intellectual property regime.230
Doctrines like the idea/expression dichotomy and the lack of
copyrightability for facts go some distance to addressing these concerns.231
Last, it bears remembering that authors are not legally required to create.
To the extent they choose to do so, they do so in a world in which exclusive
control of their creativity ends at the moment of fixation.
b. Publish the Work
Publication is no longer required for copyright protection, but remains
relevant in considering a copyright holder’s expectations of control.232
Most famously, in holding that advance publication of Gerald Ford’s
autobiography was not a fair use, the Supreme Court relied in large part on
229. See, e.g., Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (rejecting effort to use copyright law to shield contents of e-mails regarding problems
with manufacturer’s voting machines).
230. Most famously, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
231. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
232. In the past, creators avoided publication in order to avoid some of the tradeoffs
inherent in the prevailing copyright statute. For example, Disney reportedly forewent for a
time the profits possible from distributing movies in their catalog in order to keep the works
from being published. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 14–16.
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the argument that the challenged use prevented Ford from being the first to
market.233 The first fair use factor, purpose and character of the use, tilted
in Ford publisher’s favor because the manuscript had been stolen.234 The
second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, favored the publisher
because Ford’s work was unpublished.235 Indeed, enough rode on Ford’s
control of the physical manuscript, and its theft, that one could view the
Court’s analysis as resting in part on private property considerations.236
An analogous analysis should apply in implied authorization cases. The
right of first publication is powerful.237 Before its exercise, the ability of
others to interact with copyrighted matter is necessarily constrained.
Interferences with the first publication right may require conduct that a
court would find unreasonable. So one who posts large excerpts of, say, a
stolen Harry Potter manuscript has little claim of a reasonable belief in a
right to do so. There are, nonetheless, contexts in which courts may be less
solicitous of the publication right given the nature of the material. For
example, the maker of voting machines could not use copyright to suppress
publication of documents detailing flaws in its product.238 Copyright
holders in similar shoes would have no reasonable expectation that a
memoranda’s contents would remain private if internal document control
procedures were to break down.
But once an author has chosen the time and place of first publication,
user expectations of what may be done with a work necessarily change. As
argued above, when an author makes his work part of culture, he alters the
environment of his audience.239 Insofar as his work achieves an audience,
it displaces other works or components of the public domain that might
have otherwise engaged the public. And when a copyright holder tries to
make his work culturally prominent, he assumes the risk that his audience
may interact with it.240 User expectations with respect to how they may
interact with the world around them necessarily come into play.

233. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552–53 (1985).
234. Id. at 563 (“The trial court found that The Nation knowingly exploited a purloined
manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of fair use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction
of consent as justification.” (citation omitted)).
235. Id. at 564 (“A use that so clearly infringes the copyright holder’s interests in
confidentiality and creative control is difficult to characterize as ‘fair.’”).
236. The current version of § 107 makes clear that even uses of unpublished works may
be deemed fair. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”).
237. As noted by then-professor Breyer in his skepticism of the need to expand copyright
protection. Breyer, supra note 56, at 299–300.
238. Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
239. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
240. See Waldron, supra note 127, at 885 (“[T]his environment, having been thrust upon
us by those in whose interests cultural commodities circulate, is now the only one we have,
so that it is now in a sense unfair to deny us the liberty to make of it what we will.”).
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c. Publish in an Easily Accessible Medium
The medium of publication also affects reasonable expectations about
what may be done with a copyrighted work. Regardless of the use to which
the copy is ultimately put, there is a difference between copying a movie
during its initial theatrical run and its DVD incarnation. Copyright holders
naturally assume differing levels of risk that unauthorized use will be made
of their work as it is made available in more accessible media.
Further gradations are possible within a medium. The governing norms
of a submedium may bear on reasonable interpretations of an author’s
conduct. Publishing on the Internet carries different implications than
publishing on paper. Within the Internet context, posting to a blog that is
accessible to others via RSS feeds is different than publishing an encrypted
e-book available for licensed downloading.241
d. License Derivatives
The displacement effect described above is especially acute when the
rights holder engages in broad licensing of derivative works of the
copyrighted creation. That is to say, the Harry Potter Lexicon is much
more likely in a world of Harry Potter movies, action figures, and school
lunchboxes than one without.242 Current fair use law responds in a mixed
manner to the consequences of ubiquity. Social prominence may make
claims of transformation more palatable,243 while also making a court more
likely to view certain complementary markets as “belonging” ex ante to the
copyright holder.244 The implied authorization approach would recognize
that personal users of copyrighted material are likely to involve works that
appear across cultural media.
e. Notice
Part of the problem with relying on traditional implied license law to
address personal use is the prospect that simple disclaimers of permission
may suffice to negate any argument that a license has been granted.245 As
argued above, that solution is insufficiently respectful of user property
expectations. That said, whether a rights holder gives notice of the scope of
241. Cf. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 39 (noting that Usenet postings “are frequently written
in an environment in which posting and sharing are the expected norms” and that the
“universal expectation of netiquette is that these postings will be forwarded” but suggesting
that the creation of other legal regimes may be appropriate to address the issue).
242. See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(enjoining publication of Lexicon).
243. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1272 (11th Cir.
2001) (“[The Wind Done Gone] uses several of [Gone With the Wind’s] most famous lines,
but vests them with a completely new significance.”).
244. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d
Cir. 1998) (weighing market effect factor against maker of quiz book about Seinfeld even
though copyright owner had not entered market).
245. See supra Part I.C.2.
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permitted use of her work (and the prominence of that notice) is at least a
factor to consider when determining the objective reasonableness of a use
made of the work.
f. Use of Access Controls
Just as a publisher’s choice of media affects the ease with which a
copyist may interact with a work, so too does the use of digital rights
management (DRM) or similar access controls. The more work needed on
the user’s end to engage in the desired act, the less reasonable a belief in a
right to copy the material.
Of course, DRM raises important issues regarding fair use rights and
consumer expectations.246 Publishing copyrighted material with DRM or
similar access controls should not be seen as necessarily precluding implied
authorization. It is, however, indicative of an assertion of control in the
copyrighted material that may suffice to negate the authorization implied by
the simple ownership of copying tools by the user. And, indeed, use of
such access controls may impose a cost on the copyright holder with respect
to customer relations and product popularity.247
g. Availability and Utilization of Takedown Procedures
17 U.S.C. § 512 sets forth detailed procedures by which a copyright
holder may direct an Internet Service Provider to remove purportedly
infringing material from its network. As a result, web page viewers have
reason to assume publically available websites that host third-party
copyrighted content to be fair game for interaction. To illustrate, many
websites make new music available for download.248 A web surfer
encountering such a site is likely to assume the right to download the music
insofar as the website is public and has not been shut down (or had
infringing content removed) by objecting copyright holders.
The
reasonable assumption, instead, is that the music is provided to the site to
make available for download for promotional purposes (i.e., in hopes that
consumers will then purchase the underlying albums or tickets to live
performances). In contrast, one who encounters music on an anonymous
peer-to-peer network could not reasonably make a similar assumption.249

246. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, EMI Says DRM-Free Music Is Selling Well, ARS TECHNICA
(June 20, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/06/emi-says-drm-free-music-isselling-well.ars (detailing sales improvements after DRM dropped from for-sale music); Ben
Kuchera, Gamers Fight Back Against Lackluster Spore Gameplay, Bad DRM, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 8, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2008/09/gamers-fight-backagainst-lackluster-spore-gameplay-bad-drm.ars (describing user unhappiness with DRM of
computer game Spore).
248. See, e.g., MBV, http://www.mbvmusic.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
249. See also infra Part III.D.2.b.
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h. Cease and Desist
Finally, copyright holders may both authorize use of their works under
section 106 and withdraw such authorization. Whether the copyright holder
has ordered the user to stop is obviously relevant to determining the
reasonableness of a copyright use. This banal observation underscores a
more important point. If part of the danger of excessively sweeping
copyright rights is the ex ante chilling of socially beneficial activity, then a
corrective is to treat uses that follow an explicit objection from a rights
holder less leniently than those that precede such an objection.
C. Is this Fair to Rights Holders?
Is the framework proposed herein “fair” to copyright holders? To some
extent, the answer lies outside the scope of this Article and instead in the
literature questioning whether copyrights are justified at their current
strength. An argument that would, if implemented, lessen copyright’s
power is more just if copyrights are already too powerful and less so if they
are not. And, of course, the focus here is not on copyright holder rights but
on vindicating independent property interests held by individuals in the
tools they use to interact with copyrighted material.
That said, the argument presented here is, if not demonstrably just in the
abstract, at least nothing radical in its respect for the property rights of
copyright holders.250 First, authorization rights remain with the copyright
holders. Requiring rights holders to take steps to ensure that their property
not be used in an objectionable way is consistent with traditional property
conceptions. Property law accords less protection to owners who fail to
maintain control of their property. Property may be lost through adverse
possession or abandonment,251 and others may gain use rights through
implied or prescriptive easements or licenses that become irrevocable
through reliance.252 And the requirement that property owners opt-out of

250. Once again assuming arguendo that copyrights are property.
251. But cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 399
(2010) (observing that “[t]he conventional account holds that at common law, corporeal
hereditaments like fee simple interests could not be abandoned but incorporeal interests (e.g.,
easements, mineral interests, and licenses) could” and criticizing common law hostility to
abandonment of real property).
252. In discussing implied license in the patent context, Mark Janis points to cases in
which the presence of waters on private property creates an implied license to navigate them
until the owner remedies their presence. Janis, supra note 2, at 505 n.475; cf. Litman, Lawful
Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1917 (observing that the “property law solution” to the
“mess” of divisible copyright rights “is the easement by implication”). And outside the
traditional property context, admiralty law provides salvors the right to demand
compensation from owners of rescued property. 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAW § 16-1 (4th ed. 2004) (listing formal elements of a general maritime law
salvage claim: “(1) there must be a marine peril placing the property at risk of loss,
destruction, or deterioration; (2) the salvage service must be voluntarily rendered and not
required by an existing duty or by special contract; and (3) the salvage efforts must be
successful, in whole or in part”).
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uses of their property is not alien to the world of real property.253 Similar
principles should apply in intellectual property law.254 Copyright holders
who choose not to publish or decide not to publish widely will naturally
receive greater protection. But those who wish to reap the benefits of
releasing their work into the wild must take the bitter with the sweet.
Second, an objection focused on fairness to copyright holders must be
specific about which copyright holders face unfair treatment. Many
unauthorized or tolerated copyright uses benefit the copyright holder. So
free distribution of an album may stimulate later demand.255 Fan
communities that make use of copyrighted material may enhance the
popularity of a work and create demand for sequels or other derivative
works.256 But if fears of copyright enforcement deter such uses then
authors who would benefit from them lose out from the assumption that
nothing is permitted absent explicit consent. And that consent may be
costly to give insofar as copyright holders face difficulty in precisely
calibrating authorization so that it is understood without being seen as
authorizing unacceptable works.257 Further, many copyright holders no
longer wish to assert control over their works, but will not or cannot expend
effort to communicate that signal, contributing to the “orphan work”
problem. Because there is no one to authorize use, projects are unable to
proceed for fear that a lawsuit might arise after investment, creating the risk

253. Tim Wu notes the example of requiring owners of rural property to post no
trespassing notices for trespass liability to exist. Wu, supra note 210, at 621 (citing N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-2115 (McKinney 2010)), 625; Mark R. Sigmon, Note, Hunting
and Posting on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549, 558 (2004) (noting that “twentynine states require posting to exclude hunters” and collecting statutes).
254. A trademark is abandoned, for example, when “its use has been discontinued with
intent not to resume such use” or “any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of
omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods
or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a
mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). Abandonment is a defense to an infringement claim. Id.
§ 1115(b)(2). Three years without use is prima facie evidence of abandonment. Id. § 1127.
255. As was famously the case for the Wilco album Yankee Hotel Foxtrot. Yankee Hotel
Foxtrot, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yankee_Hotel_Foxtrot (last visited Oct. 23,
2010).
256. To take a recent example of the former, a wedding video set to the tune of Chris
Brown’s song Forever became a viral hit online. Because YouTube employs content
management tools to aid copyright holders in monetizing content, Brown’s label was able to
sell the song directly to viewers watching the video. Sales of the single shot up as a result of
the user-generated content. Chris La Rosa & Ali Sandler, I Now Pronounce You Monetized:
A YouTube Video Case Study, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (July 30, 2009, 9:32 AM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/i-now-pronounce-you-monetized-youtube.html.
The making of the movie Serenity, based on the short-lived science fiction series Firefly, is
an example of fan culture stimulating further demand for copyrighted work. Jeff Jensen &
Jeff Labrecque, “Serenity” How?, ENTM’T WEEKLY, Sept. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,1102753,00.html.
257. See Wu, supra note 210, at 628 (discussing potential efficiency of a copyright “No
Action Policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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of a holdup.258 In short, the fairness objection has to explain why one class
of copyright holders is to be favored at the expense of others.
D. Applications/Implications
This section explores some of the implications of the above analysis by
applying the implied authorization framework both to historic copyright
debates and some modern issues.
1. Past Applications
Looking back to the development of the first-sale doctrine and the pre1976 history of the performance right reveals that there is nothing
remarkable about the focus on user property rights discussed above. More
recent precedents involving Google’s search activities and the DMCA are in
accord.
a. First Sale
In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,259 the Supreme Court established the
first-sale doctrine by refusing to give effect to a notice printed in copies of a
novel that forbade resale at less than retail price. The Court concluded that
the copyright holder’s statutory right to “vend” the work did not extend so
far.260 The Court styled its opinion as an exercise in statutory interpretation
conducted “in the light of its main purpose to secure the right of multiplying
copies of the work.”261 But the decision looks more like the preservation of
user property interests against copyright encroachment.
The Court hinted that a plausible argument could be made that the right
to “vend” extended to later sales,262 but it did not tarry long over the
prospect. Instead, it concluded that one sale constituted the full exercise of
the right.263 The need to protect common law property rights appears to
have guided the conclusion that the right of vending only encompassed one
sale.
What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to sell the
copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the reservation of
the right to have the remedies of the statute against an infringer because of

258. The problem is especially acute in the context of orphan works. See, e.g., U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
259. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). Congress codified the doctrine in the 1909 Act. 17 U.S.C. § 27
(1909) (repealed 1976); see 4 PATRY, supra note 43, § 13:19.
260. 210 U.S. at 350–51.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 351 (“True, the statute also secures, to make [the right of copying] effectual,
the sole right to vend copies of the book . . . .”).
263. Id. (“[Plaintiff] has exercised the right to vend.”).
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the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless the purchaser sells at a
price fixed in the notice. 264

The Court’s concern for the clean “title” of downstream purchasers
stemmed largely from copyright’s limited nature. It exists only as “the
special creation of the statute.”265 Common law property expectations
could not so lightly be disturbed without actual privity of contract with the
personal property owner (or a clearer directive from Congress).266
b. Performance Rights
The federal courts considered the scope of copyright performance rights
multiple times before the 1976 rewrite of the Copyright Act. These cases
required ascertaining the extent to which copyright holders could control
music once it was embodied in a licensed broadcast. Did listeners become
performers simply by turning their radios on? The modern statute provides
detailed rules for when the owner of a broadcast receiver becomes a
performer.267 But before Congress clarified matters, the courts adopted a
view consistent with the implied authorization approach.
In Buck v. Debaum,268 the plaintiff accused a café owner of infringement
because the café customers could overhear music from an on-site radio.
The California district court rejected the claim, focusing on the copyright
holder’s decision to license the copyright for broadcast. Once that decision
was made, plaintiffs “impliedly sanctioned and consented to any ‘pick up’
out of the air that was possible in radio reception.”269 A copyright owner
who wished to exercise full control over the “property” interest in the music
composition had the option of refusing to authorize performance by the

264. Id. (emphasis added).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 350 (noting that purchasers “made no agreement as to the control of future
sales of the book, and took upon themselves no obligation to enforce the notice printed in the
book”); cf. 4 PATRY, supra note 43, § 13:18 (noting Bobbs-Merrill as indicative of judicial
reaction “against attempts to impose restraints on the alienation of tangible property”).
Similar logic supported the patent exhaustion doctrine. It relied on a demarcation
between patent exclusion rights, created by federal statute, and rights to use an object,
governed by state common law property rights. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 539, 549 (1852) (“And when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no
longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the
protection of the act of Congress.”); id. at 550 (“The implement or machine becomes his
private, individual property, not protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws
of the State in which it is situated.”); id. at 553 (“[I]t can hardly be maintained that Congress
could lawfully deprive a citizen of the use of his property after he had purchased the absolute
and unlimited right from the inventor, and when that property was no longer held under the
protection and control of the General Government, but under the protection of the
State . . . .”).
267. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006).
268. 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929). Then-current copyright law gave the copyright holder
the exclusive right to perform musical compositions publicly for profit.
269. Id. at 735.
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broadcast station. Once so authorized, however, further control over the
airwaves270 or listener equipment was inappropriate.271
The Supreme Court curtailed Debaum’s scope two years later in Buck v.
Jewell-La Salle Realty Co.272 and held that a hotel performed the plaintiff’s
copyrighted work when guests could hear broadcasts through the hotel’s
radio and loud speakers. The Court stopped short of abrogating Debaum,
but rejected much of its reasoning. For the Court it was significant that the
broadcast in Jewell was unlicensed. “It may be that proper control over
broadcasting programs would automatically secure to the copyright owner
sufficient protection from unauthorized public performances by use of a
radio receiving set . . . .”273 In other words, the Court held open the
possibility that the implied license logic of Debaum would have prevailed
had the broadcast been licensed.274
And indeed the Court steadily walked back its reasoning in Jewell in the
twilight years of the 1909 Act. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc.275 concluded that the operations of a CATV system, which
used cable to transmit broadcast signals received from hill-mounted
antennae to subscriber homes, did not constitute performances under the
copyright statute.276 The Court limited Jewell to its facts, noting that the
case did not involve a situation in which the initial transmission was
authorized.277 The Court drew a distinction, based in part on Debaum’s
reasoning, between viewers and performers. Although user property
interests did not overtly guide the opinion, the majority cited the role that
viewer-owned equipment brings to the viewer/performer relationship. The
Court recognized that people use property to interact with copyrighted
material as members of the audience and doing so does not subject them to
copyright’s regulation.278 The background right to use one’s property as
one chooses absent clear legal rules to the contrary is a component of this
conclusion.
If an individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house,
and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be
“performing” the programs he received on his television set. The result
would be no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative
270. Id. at 736 (copyright holder who licenses work “must be held to have acquiesced in
the utilization of all forces of nature that are resultant from the licensed broadcast of his
copyrighted musical composition”).
271. Id. (noting unreasonableness of expecting radio owners to turn dial if a copyrightprotected music were broadcast in between unprotected matter).
272. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
273. Id. at 199.
274. Id. n.5.
275. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
276. Id. at 399–400; see also Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S.
394 (1974).
277. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 396–97 n.18; see also id. at 401 n.30 (contending Jewell’s
application would “retroactively . . . impose copyright liability where it has never been
acknowledged to exist before”).
278. Id. at 398.
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antenna for the same purpose. The only difference in the case of CATV is
that the antenna system is erected and owned not by its users but by an
entrepreneur. 279

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken280 pounded the final nail in
Jewell’s coffin by finding no public performance where a restaurant
operator had connected his radio to ceiling loudspeakers. Once again, the
opinion did not explicitly rely on user property rights but framed its
conclusions to respect them. Like Debaum, Aiken emphasized the
consequences to user property rights if the strong copyright argument were
taken to its logical conclusion.
And a ruling that a radio listener ‘performs’ every broadcast that he
receives would be highly inequitable for two distinct reasons. First, a
person in Aiken’s position would have no sure way of protecting himself
from liability for copyright infringement except by keeping his radio set
turned off. For even if he secured a license from ASCAP, he would have
no way of either foreseeing or controlling the broadcast of compositions
whose copyright was held by someone else. Secondly, to hold that all in
Aiken’s position ‘performed’ these musical compositions would be to
authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is basically a
single public rendition of a copyrighted work. The exaction of such
multiple tribute would go far beyond what is required for the economic
protection of copyright owners, and would be wholly at odds with the
balanced congressional purpose behind 17 U.S.C. [§] 1(e)[.]281

Congress would soon undo the Court’s handiwork with respect to most
commercial establishments.282 But again, the argument here is not that
Congress may not interfere with a user’s property-based expectations. It is
rather that courts may honor those expectations where the Copyright Act
text is sufficiently open. Those expectations have some descriptive force in
the performance rights cases. If a copyright holder chooses to authorize the
transmission of her protected material, she assumes the risk that others will
interact with it using their own property. To the extent those uses are
reasonable, courts should not lightly conclude that the copyright monopoly
extends to control the downstream property of those who encounter and
then use the works.
c. Chamberlain
The Federal Circuit has used user property rights to blunt some of the
sharper edges of the DMCA. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink

279. Id. at 400.
280. 422 U.S. 151 (1975). The majority dismissed Jewell as perhaps applicable to a
contributory infringement situation. Id. at 160 n.11.
281. Id. at 162–63 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
282. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006); cf. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 164–65 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the result) (noting that defendant in Aiken was not a “mere listener” but benefitted
commercially from use of the radio).
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Technologies, Inc.283 considered whether the DMCA creates liability for the
manufacturer of a replacement garage door opener remote control.284 The
plaintiff contended that defendant’s opener circumvented controls guarding
“access” to the purportedly copyrighted computer code controlling its
device.285 The court held that copyright rights could not be leveraged in
this manner to control the market for complementary goods.
The court’s reasoning utilized a range of arguments. For present
purposes, the relevant portion of the Federal Circuit’s opinion concerned
the requirement that a DMCA circumvention claim requires that the access
in question must be taken “without the authority of the copyright owner.”286
The statute could be interpreted to mean that such authorization requires
actual assent from the copyright holder. The court instead took a broader
view of the relevant context.
Because lack of authorization is an element of a DMCA claim, the court
concluded that the burden of establishing it rests with the plaintiff.287 In
determining whether access was unauthorized, the panel looked not to the
statements of the copyright holder, but also considered what is generally
authorized by copyright law.288 Here, consumer property rights matter;
garage-door purchasers are allowed to use the devices regardless of whether
the sellers conveyed explicit authorization to do so.289 They retain this
right notwithstanding copyright.
“Like all property owners taking
legitimate steps to protect their property, however, copyright owners relying
on the anti-circumvention provisions remain bound by all other relevant
bodies of law,” and the DMCA did not change “the legal landscape
governing the reasonable expectations of consumers or competitors.”290 If
the copyright holder wanted to deauthorize the use in question, its hopes
would have to lie in an explicit contractual understanding.291

283. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
284. Id. at 1182–83.
285. Id. at 1185.
286. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
287. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203–04.
288. Id. at 1193 (“The premise underlying this initial assignment of burden is that the
copyright laws authorize members of the public to access a work, but not to copy it. The law
therefore places the burden of proof on the party attempting to establish that the
circumstances of its case deviate from these normal expectations . . . .”).
289. Id. To be sure, the panel did not see itself as broadening the understanding of what
is generally deemed authorized copying (as opposed to access). Id. (“[D]efendants must
prove authorized copying[,] and plaintiffs must prove unauthorized access.”).
290. Id. at 1194. The opinion elsewhere expresses concern that an overly broad
interpretation of the DMCA action would permit copyright holders to restrict consumer use
of personal property. Id. at 1201 (“Chamberlain’s proposed construction would allow any
manufacturer of any product to add a single copyrighted sentence or software fragment to its
product, wrap the copyrighted material in a trivial ‘encryption’ scheme, and thereby gain the
right to restrict consumers’ rights to use its products in conjunction with competing
products.”).
291. Id. at 1202 n.17 (noting that it is unclear whether DMCA liability exists for
consumer who “circumvents a technological measure controlling access to a copyrighted
work in a manner that enables uses permitted under the Copyright Act but prohibited by
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2. Prospective Applications
This part concludes by considering some prospective implications of
implied authorization.
a. User-Generated Content
Implied authorization creates an alternative, non-fair-use-reliant basis for
protecting user-generated content and communities dedicated to
reimagining and repurposing characters and settings from popular works.292
User created content is ubiquitous in part because users expect that they
have a right to interact with the culture around them, albeit generally
subject to a norm of non-commercial exploitation.293 When fan-driven
activities stay on the non-commercial side of the line, copyright holders
often welcome their efforts.294
But not always. This creates uncertainty even when such appropriation
may be beneficial or at least not harmful to the copyright owner. Edward
Lee has proposed an approach for identifying which uses of this nature are
appropriate.295 The implied authorization framework goes further by
providing a basis for viewing such uses as legal by bringing user rights and
expectations into the picture.
Creators of non-commercial user-generated content are not pirates; they
are fulfilling a natural impulse to engage in self expression. Copyright
owners who expended effort to be part of the world of their audience have
reduced grounds for complaint when the predictable happens. And
allowing rights holders broad authority to go after users threatens the
interests of other rights holders who benefit from such “tolerated” uses.296
To be sure, copyright holders have rights vis-à-vis fan and related
communities. But it is reasonable to require the affirmative (as opposed to
passive) exercise of those rights (e.g., by the use of notice-and-takedown
contract” but noting that plaintiff “did not attempt to limit its customers use of its product by
contract” and reserving issue).
292. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New
Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997).
293. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1459, 1494–95 (proposing a five-factor test for informal copyright practices to identify
situations in which the “development of an informal copyright practice [is] more likely and
more legitimate”). Several of Professor Lee’s factors would be relevant to the question of
implied authorization. His non-exhaustive list of factors is:
(1) unlitigated use and the absence of settled case law finding the practice or type
of practice in question constitutes an infringement;
(2) the existence of a novel issue of law, such as one involving a new technology;
(3) the existence of a colorable fair use defense, or other exemption or defense;
(4) high transaction costs in obtaining formal licenses from copyright holders; and
(5) no express objection by the copyright holder as to the particular use in question
or the type of practice, or some indication that the copyright holder might allow it.
Id. at 1494.
296. See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text.
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procedures) before creators of user-generated content find themselves on
the receiving end of a damages claim. This largely tracks the norms and
practices of such communities, but it should be understood as the balance
struck between competing property rights and not the byproduct of
copyright holder beneficence or sluggishness in assertion of their rights.
b. Everyday Certainty
Implied authorization also provides legal grounding for everyday nonauthorial activities taking place on the Internet, many of which we take for
granted as legal. We forward e-mail and view publicly accessible websites
without a thought to copyright ramifications. As noted above, traditional
conceptions of implied license go a long way toward providing legal
comfort to such uses to the extent such comfort is necessary.297
Implied authorization may also mitigate the risk of “copytraps.”298
Suppose a consumer innocently comes across a website offering free music
downloads that turn out to be illicit. Should she be subject to suit? An
affirmative answer could chill a range of legitimate commerce, as many
copyright holders wish to use such websites to promote their work. The
fear of running afoul of copyright laws, moreover, could lead risk-averse
users to restrict their browsing or downloading activities to websites with
official affiliation to major content owners like the broadcast networks or
movie studios, creating a barrier to entry for lesser known, but equally
legitimate, alternatives.
One response would be to amend the Copyright Act to relieve the burden
of its strict liability provisions.299 But a similar effect could be
accomplished if courts take user property rights seriously. As argued
above,300 if a website is public, and subject to the notice-and-takedown
regime of 17 U.S.C. § 512, then Internet users should be permitted to rely
on the publicly accessible nature of a site. In other words, downloading
from an anonymous peer-to-peer network is not the same thing as doing so
from a public website. Some boundary issues may arise with respect to
sites based outside the United States, but the implied authorization
framework offers a mechanism for providing assurance that innocent
conduct will not be a basis for liability.301
The need to provide consumers with certainty that their conduct will not
produce liability for money damages extends beyond actual litigation
danger, which is low in many if not most contemporary “copytrap” settings.

297. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
298. See generally Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285 (2009).
299. See id. at 323.
300. See supra Part III.B.4.g.
301. Cf. Lee, supra note 295, at 1496–99 (applying informality test to label photocopying
for personal use a legitimate practice while concluding that unauthorized music file sharing
is illegitimate).
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Danger also lies in the pressure placed on technology manufacturers or
providers to limit the capabilities of their products.302
c. The “Fairness” of Opt-Out Requirements
If it is true that copyright holders should be expected to engage in selfprotection to avoid audience intermeddling,303 then courts should be more
receptive to “opt-out” regimes with respect to copyright uses.
Opt out is controversial, as demonstrated by the fallout from Google’s
attempt to use an opt-out model in digitizing books into a searchable
database. But an implied authorization defense of opt out is not a far way
off from the approach taken by Field v. Google Inc.304 Field involved a
challenge to the search engine model itself.305 Google indexes the Internet
on an opt-out system. That is, its indexing programs will respect the wishes
of site owners who do not want to be indexed by Google if they include a
machine-readable metatag (invisible to viewers of the page) to that effect.
This method emerged as the industry norm, likely because most websites
want to be found.306 The plaintiff nonetheless “decided to manufacture a
claim for copyright infringement . . . in the hopes of making money from
Google’s standard practice” by placing material online, allowing Google’s
robots to index it, and bringing suit.307
The district court rejected the attempt for a variety of reasons, including
fair use and estoppel, but of note here was its invocation and approval of
Google’s implied license defense. Though Field has been criticized for
straying from the doctrine’s traditional bounds,308 it fits well into the
framework advocated by this Article. The plaintiff ignored norms—
industry standards in the court’s telling—regarding acceptable use of his
copyrighted material, and refrained from taking a simple step to prevent
Google’s use of his work.309 The court viewed this conduct as conveying
permission to Google to use the author’s work,310 but it can as easily be
interpreted as a failure to adequately assert rights against Google’s
reasonable expectation—based on prevailing norms—of a right to use its
own property to interact with material placed on the Internet.

302. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part III.B.4.
304. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
305. Though it is not the only one. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487
F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
306. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
307. Id. at 1113.
308. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197,
1226 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]hough not seemingly acknowledged by the district court in
Field, the Ninth Circuit has explained that the implied license doctrine in copyright cases is
to be very narrowly construed.”).
309. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
310. Id. (“[Plaintiff’s] conduct is reasonably interpreted as a grant of a license to Google
for that use.”).
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To be sure, in examples like Google Books courts might consider the
difference between works set free on the Internet instead of into the world
of hard-bound copies in determining precisely where to draw the line
between opt-in or opt-out mechanisms.311 But if copyright disputes are
more than simple trespass situations, then opt-out requirements for
copyright owners are reasonable for ameliorating the conflict between
competing property interests.312
d. Fair Use
Basing implied authorization on user property rights and gaps in the
Copyright Act addresses the problem of establishing a non-fair-use-reliant
basis for asserting strong user rights in the face of copyright claims. It
avoids the body of doctrine that has grown around fair use and the prospect
that fair use precedents may be insufficiently flexible to protect personal
use rights.
That is not to say that the preceding is irrelevant to fair use. As a
doctrinal matter, the implied authorization framework could be
implemented through the fair use defense. Indeed, fair use is the simplest
route by which the property rights of users could be imported into an
infringement analysis. Even though implied authorization draws from a
body of law independent of fair use, section 107 of the Copyright Act may
still be the best vehicle for presenting it in a doctrinally cognizable manner.
Focusing on competing property interests could also help broaden current
conceptions of fair use, with user property rights giving courts a basis for
expanding the considerations at play in fair use analysis. Rather than a way
to circumvent fair use’s rigidity, implied authorization may be a means for
breathing new life into section 107.313 At the same time, focusing on
mediating competing property claims in light of existing norms would
provide guideposts for judges worried that fair use may become a blank
check for widespread infringement.
e. Taking Context Seriously
Using implied authorization within the fair use framework also takes
seriously the Supreme Court’s command that evaluating copyright fair use
claims is a contextual endeavor. This dictate frustrates personal copyright
uses because of the inability to secure ex ante certainty that a particular use

311. See supra Part III.B.4.c.
312. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1979) (stating that in a nuisance case,
“the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm” is an “important” factor in
evaluating the gravity of the harm).
313. For example, whether a user is exercising personal property rights has ready
applicability to the first fair use factor: the purpose and character of the challenged use.
Courts could treat as relevant whether the defendant had a reasonable property-backed
expectation that her use was authorized. A court could similarly evaluate the conduct of the
copyright holder in determining the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.
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is legal. But if our right to use our property to interact with the world is
contextual, depending in part on our understanding that a particular use is
both illegal under the Copyright Act as well as unauthorized, might that
mean that ambiguity with respect to a use’s legality may excuse a use later
found to be infringing?
The objective reasonableness of a user’s belief that she had the right to
interact with copyrighted material helps determine whether that use is
implicitly authorized. To the extent that copyright law (and the conduct of
the copyright holder) makes clear that such use is unauthorized, then the
user’s claim to a reasonable property-backed expectation is questionable.
Conversely, if the legal status of an act is untested or ambiguous, the claim
to reasonableness is stronger.314
In the current copyright context, rights holders may be pleased to have so
much up in the air. After all, uncertainty about a use’s legality may
redound to their benefit when cease-and-desist letters are mailed. Since
many copyright users lack the resources to pursue litigation (or are illequipped to face the prospect of an adverse judgment), the assertion of
claims has an obvious in terrorem effect. Given those effects, copyright
holders have an incentive to avoid declaratory judgment actions that might
preemptively establish the legality of particular uses and undermine the
deterrent value of uncertainty.315
But what if this uncertainty could benefit users as well as copyright
owners? What if doctrinal muddiness could offer a basis for excusing a
defendant’s conduct? If the defendant’s objective reasonableness is a factor
to consider in determining whether her use of copyrighted matter was
authorized, then the state of the law is an appropriate factor to consider.
The creation of what might be called a “qualified immunity” for
copyright users offers a number of benefits. Qualified immunity is a
doctrine in civil rights law. Federal law provides a cause of action against
those who act under color of state law to cause “the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” and certain
federal laws.316 Qualified immunity excuses such violations where the
government official’s “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”317 The Supreme Court views the doctrine as balancing the need to
deter civil rights violations with the need to provide government officials
with breathing space to act in settings in which legal uncertainty could deter
potentially beneficial conduct.318 Copyright law also tries to strike a
314. Cf. supra note 295 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Lee’s proposed
framework).
315. See supra note 61.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
317. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
318. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“Qualified immunity
balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction,
and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”).
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balance: it seeks to protect the rights of creators in their expressions while
ensuring a sufficient public domain for everyone else. But uncertainty
about the line separating infringement from lawful use may deter socially
beneficial copyright uses, leaving society as a whole worse off. If users
could expect that reasonable uses would at least be excused from money
damages, then more of these deterred works might come into existence.
Nor is this necessarily a bad deal for copyright holders. If prospective
plaintiffs also had something to lose from unsettled copyright law, perhaps
more would be clarified.319
CONCLUSION
Copyright has been around long enough for us to forget just how
extraordinary it is. Copyright holders may invoke the coercive apparatus of
the state to regulate the private exercise of property rights. They may do so
regardless of whether the regulated property owners are engaged in
commercial activity that might threaten the copyright holder’s commercial
monopoly on the sale of works that embody the copyright. Normalizing
this state of affairs by calling it part and parcel of the “property” owned by
the copyright holder obscures copyright’s parallel status as an interference
with property rights.
Keeping this interference in mind makes copyright’s aspiration to
property status less impressive. A variety of doctrines mediate competing
claims where both sides have property rights. So it is with copyright law,
where copyright’s negative easement competes with, and often yields to,
the property rights of users, e.g., with the first-sale doctrine. Similar
collisions occur when copyright holders seek control over the tools
copyright users use to interact with copyrighted material. Calling copyright
“property” tells us nothing about how to resolve these disputes.
Somebody’s property rights will be curtailed.
To know who loses, we must look not to property rhetoric but to the law.
When we do, we see that property rights matter, but they do not always
favor copyright holders. User property rights are rooted in the common
319. The proper lessons of civil rights law as applied to the copyright context could be an
article unto itself. To the extent we want to keep the analogy a close one, it is worth noting
that the Supreme Court recently diluted qualified immunity doctrine’s ability to “clearly
establish” law by abandoning the requirement that a court determine whether the alleged
facts make out a constitutional violation before determining whether the right in question
was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), once required courts to engage
in a two-step inquiry. First, the court had to determine whether the plaintiff alleged a
violation of a constitutional right. If so, the court had to consider whether said right was
“clearly established” at the time of the challenged act. Id. at 201. The Court modified the
rule in 2009 to permit judges to exercise discretion in deciding whether to address both
prongs of the Saucier inquiry, meaning courts can simply conclude that the right is not
clearly established and do nothing to aid in that endeavor. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818 (“On
reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set
forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”). That said,
even after Pearson, courts retain the ability to use qualified immunity doctrine to clarify the
state of the law and an analogous doctrine could play a similar part in copyright law.
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law, not statute. Where a statute alters the common law baseline it must do
so clearly. This principle has been used to expand copyright’s scope into
third party liability, but it also could provide a basis for limiting copyright’s
reach. To the extent the 1976 Copyright Act fails to clearly redefine
longstanding user expectations of rights to interact with protected content,
those common law expectations may effectively curtail copyright. In
particular, the statute’s open text surrounding a copyright holder’s ability to
“authorize” certain acts with respect to her work invites courts to consider
whether the copyright holder has exercised sufficient control over her
property to undermine the property-backed expectations of users, which
may also be rooted in widely held social norms.
The alternative is to assume that Congress sweepingly—and without
express comment—curtailed the property interests of millions of citizens
with only limited room for courts to protect private property against
overreaching copyright claims. There may be reasons to believe that
proposition, but a dedication to the sanctity of property is not one of them.

